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I.

INTRODUCTION

This article compares issues in European occupational
pension law with the same issues in American Employee Benefits
law. The research question addressed is: How different are the
European Union (EU) and the United States of America (US)
when it comes to private and occupational pensions?
Quite
unexpectedly, they might seem quite similar at first sight. This
has to do with the way pension systems are presented by
economists and sociologists in various models. In international
comparisons it is quite common to refer to the so-called three pillar
model. 1 In Part II this model is refuted. Instead of the model a
legal patchwork is presented for the comparison. At first sight this
legal patchwork looks very similar in both the EU and the US.
However at a closer look, the EU and the US differ widely from
one another for some rather obvious reasons.
Therefore, in- Part III the institutional and legal differences
between the EU and the US are pointed out. In Part IV some
specific issues of the occupational pensions and employee benefits
are analyzed and compared. For the US this analysis is mainly
based on the Pension Protection Act of 2006 ("PPA 2006").2 For
the EU the analysis is mainly based on a European Commission
report. The comparison deals with vesting, coverage, benefit
design, portability and communication.
In Part V there are some conclusive lessons. The comparison
between the US and the EU leads to the conclusion that the
differences between the US and the EU on occupational pensions
are a consequence of ideological differences with regard to
statutory social security.

1. See Yves Stevens, 15th Australian Colloquium of Superannuation
Researchers: Europe and Pensions: Confronting Risks and Policies (July 1920,
2007),
available at https:/Jlirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/
160068/1/STEVENSYves.pdf [hereinafter Europe and Pensions: Confronting
Risks and Policies] (stating "this so-called key structure of pensions is often
used as a reference model").
2 Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified
in scattered sections of 26 & 29 U.S.C.) (2006).
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US

A. No Model
International
comparisons
on
private
pensions
or
occupational pensions refer commonly to the so-called three pillar
model. 3 The reason for all these references is obvious. It is a very
easy way of presenting various pension schemes. However, from a
legal point of view, it oversimplifies matters drastically and
4
unnecessarily. Legally, there is not even a three pillar model.
The differences are too obvious between countries. The sole
strength of the three pillar model is indeed of a sociological or
economic nature: (nearly) everybody-irrespective of nationality5
can recognize his proper national pension system in the model.
However,
the modelling of pension systems always risks to put too much
emphasis on a certain element of a pension system without taking
into account other - equally relevant - elements. I strongly doubt
the practical relevance of all kinds of modelling of pension systems
into general types. So, when one looks around in Europe and tries to
define - in a legal manner - the different pension systems, one can
only notice that there is a huge variety of elements constituting the
pension systems. It is this variety of systems that actually

complicates the European policy debate. 6

Apart from the absurd notion of the three pillars, sociologists
and economists have invented another - legally non existing model for Europe. Often reference is made to the so-called
European Social Model] Legally, this is nonsense. Although it
clearly does not exist, many people take it for granted.8

To

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. GABRIEL AMITSIS, Jos BERGHMAN, ANTON HEMERIJCK, THEODOROS
SAKELLAROPOULOS, ANGELOS STERGIOU, & YVES STEVENS, CONNECTING
WELFARE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL MODEL 103-06
(Theodoros Sakellaropoulos, Jos Berghman, eds., Intersentia 2004). The level
of "recognition" of the model is due to the World Bank. The famous report
titled 'Averting the Old Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote
Growth (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994), popularized the concept of a
pension system supported by three pillars. Ever since that report, there have
been many interpretations. WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE OLD AGE CRISIS:
POLICIES TO PROTECT THE OLD AND PROMOTE GROWTH (Oxford University
Press 1994).
6. Europe and Pensions: Confronting Risks and Policies, supra note 1, at
23.
7. Id. at 21.
8. For example, Alain Euzeby states, "[t]he European Social Model has
been developed substantially after the second world war." ALAIN EUZEBY,
European Integration and Disparities in Social Protection Systems, in
INTERNATIONAL IMPACT UPON SOCIAL SECURITY 32 (Danny Peters ed., Kiuwer
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establish the difference with the US, the so-called European Social
Model has eight common European dimensions: values, common
identity, partnership, common challenges, common institutions,
common policy processes, commitment for welfare state/society
and some other common European dimensions. 9
What economists and sociologists try to describe are
tendencies and not legal structures. For most lawyers this is
meaningless. In their opinion, the similarities that are found can
always be found depending on the initial parameters put into an
economic or sociological model. The initial parameters will define
and delineate the results. There are a multitude of studies
claiming the end of the pension world for various Member States
based on common economic or sociological parameters. 10
Fortunately no model can take into account the complexity of
reality with all its details and its variations. Models are only
models. They should never be overestimated.
Unfortunately
however, most politicians are not pension experts and simple
models are often easier to understand. Hence pension policy is
often based on irrelevant economic models that are not related to
reality.
B. A Pension Law Patchwork
For lawyers it is easy to dispose of both the sociological and
the economic reality of models. For them, there is the "legal
reality" of a pension patchwork. In Europe pensions are, as a part
of social security, considered a strict national competence under
European Union law.11 Every Member State dictates its own
pension scheme. There are almost no unified European rules.

Law International 1998); see also Claire Aubin, A la Recherche du Modle
Social Europden, 484, 484-90 DROIT SOCIAL (2008).
9. See JOHN KVIST AND JUHO SAARI, THE EUROPEANIZATION OF SOCIAL
PROTECTION, 280 (Policy Press 2007) (providing a detailed study of the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health of Finland). This book was written
during the Finnish presidency of the European Union.
10. See generally Aino Salomdki, Public Pension Expenditure in the EPC
and the European Commission Projections: An Analysis of the Projection
Results,
at
40
(Dec.
2006),
available
at
http://ec.europa.euleconomy-finance/publications/publication825-en.pdf
(stating that "[t]he magnitude of the impact of different assumptions on
pension spending depends critically on the pension system design: how
responsive the system is to changes in economic and demographic
developments. Thus, the magnitude of the impact varies across countries.");
see also EDWARD WHITEHOUSE, PENSIONS PANORAMA: RETIREMENT-INCOME
SYSTEMS IN 53 COUNTRIES 43-45 (The International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development/The World Bank 2007). The work itself, however valuable
for economists and sociologists alike, does not give a legal insight into pension
law. Rather, it installs a typology.
11. Europe and Pensions: Confronting Risks and Policies, supra note 1, at
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Americans would say that there is practically no federal pension
law. This is logical from an historical point of view. Historically,
the different national pension systems have evolved separately
and have upheld typical national characteristics. 12 The EU was
founded in 1951 with only six Member States.13 Its main purpose
was (and is) an economic unity and not a social unity. 14 Hence
social security and pensions remained a national competence. The
EU grew gradually and the purpose remained economic.
Currently, there are twenty-seven Member States within the EU.15
Although there has been some exchange of elements in a
comparative law perspective, these exchanges of bits and pieces of
pensions systems and pension policies have certainly not lead to a
common unified pension structure or something like a "European
Pension Model".
It can even be doubted that the classical
distinction between the so-called Bismarckian, Beveridge or
Scandinavian type of pensions has any sense. 16 Legally, the
national systems are very different, and it is almost impossible to
put the legal differences in conclusive socio-economic models.
As a result, "the European pension landscape is a huge
colourful patchwork of technical pension regulations.' 7 The
twenty-seven different Member States have reacted differently to

12. YVES STEVENS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL MATRIX ON THE
MEANING OF "NATIONAL SOCIAL AND LABOUR LEGISLATION" IN DIRECTIVE
2003/41/EC WITH REGARD TO FIVE MEMBER STATES (BELGIUM / FRANCE /

GERMANY / ITALY / NETHERLANDS) 8 (European Association of Paritarian
Institutions AEIP) (2006).
13. The founding Member States are Germany, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. Europe in 12 lessons, Ten Historic
Steps, available at http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson-2/indexen.htm.
14. Europe in 12 lessons, Why the European Union?, at IV, available at,
http:// europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson 1/indexen.htm.
15. Current members are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
The current candidate members are Croatia, former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Turkey. There are 19 other European countries that are not
members of the European Union and are no candidates: Albania, Andorra,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Russia, San Marino,
Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the Vatican City State. See European
Countries, http://europa.eu/abc/european-countries/index-en.htm.
16. STEVENS, supra note 12, at 13.
17. Europe and Pensions: Confronting Risks and Policies, supra note 1, at
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the same pension risks with very polar solutions.15 The true legal
variety in Europe really becomes clear when analyzing the
concrete national reforms looking at several occupational pension
aspects:1 9
CONDITIONS.
To acquire an occupational pension
various systems exist throughout the EU. Three sets of conditions
are clearly present in most systems: a certain citizenship, a certain
number of worked years or a certain amount of paid contributions
into the pension scheme. 20 These three parameters have been used
simultaneously in various stages of different schemes. 21 This leads
to the effect that most Member States know a mixed acquisition
system for occupational pensions.
ACQUISITION

DESIGN AND CALCULATION METHODS.
There are various
calculation methods when it comes to pensions. Well known are:
defined contribution (DC), defined benefit (DB) and cash balance
(CB). Several variants exist of these types with various elements in
the formulas: earnings related, average career earnings, last five
years earnings, last year earnings, average job earnings, working
years related, average one year calculations, based on the return of
investment, guaranteed (ceiled or not ceiled) return, based on
bonuses ... 22
BENEFIT

AFFILIATION RULES AND COVERAGE.

23

Affiliation to an occupational

pension can be obligatory, optional with the requirement of insuring
oneself with the same pension level, optional without requirements,
voluntary, on demand... Occupational pension schemes can be
nationwide, sector wide, company related or individual.
24

European occupational Pensions are
organised on all different kinds of levels. Mostly it is a synonym for
the right to initiate the pension. This right can lay with the State
(state based occupational pension schemes (often obligatory
affiliation)), the social partners in certain branch of industry
(sectoral pensions), the company (occupational pensions within the
company) or the individual (personal pension provisions with or
without opting-out from employer based scheme). In nearly all
Member States the various levels exist next to one another.
LEVEL OF ORGANISATION.

25

The
different European actors work legally on different bases. The state,
insurance companies, pension funds and banks are the best known
VARIOUS

ACTORS

INTERFERE

IN

OCCUPATIONAL

PENSIONS.

18. Id.
19. See id. at 33-34 (providing a full and detailed analysis of this
patchwork).
20. Id. at 24.
21. See generally WHITEHOUSE supra note 10 at 5-9
22. Europe and Pensions: Confronting Risks and Policies, supra note 1, at
25.
23. Id. at 26.
24. Id. at 27.
25. Id. at 28.
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actors in pension schemes. The applicable regulations and laws
differ strongly between them. This has a clear incidence on the
schemes themselves. Furthermore there are insurance companies
who also run pension funds or banks and vice versa.
BOOKING OF THE OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEME. 2 6

Some Member
States such as Germany allow extensive internal booking by
companies of their occupational pension provisions (book reserves).
These bookings have a direct impact on the economic viability of the
companies and hence the country. Other European Member States
only allow external booking with or without booked reserve funds
for the contributing country.
FISCAL TREATMENT. 2 7 There are three possible moments of taxation

of occupational pensions: when the contribution is paid, when there
is a return on investment or when the pension benefit is actually
paid. Theoretically it is possible that there is a tax exemption at all
three moments or (less theoretically) that there is taxation at all
three moments. All possible variants occur within the EU.
CONTROL MECHANISMS. 25 Various control mechanism exist within
Member States to check whether the pension systems are run
properly. A mixture of authorities checks the legal, prudential,
social and financial constraints of the different pension systems
within a Member State.
These various authorities work
(unfortunately) according to quite different standards throughout
the EU.
PARTICIPATION LEVELS OF THE SOCIAL PARTNERS. 2 9

The role of the

social partners in European occupational pension systems is
relatively important compared to other Member States outside of
the Union. It is not uncommon in European Member States that the
social partners participate actively in the policy of the pension
schemes. They can for example be found in many governing
administrative bodies with advisory or even regulating power.
FINANCING METHODS. 3 0 Repartition or PAYG is no monopoly of state
based pension schemes. Legally, there are occupational pensions
based on PAYG in various Member States. 31 Furthermore collective
or individual capitalisation are found. There is also open or closed
funding.

Looking at all these different elements, it becomes quite clear
that Europe is actually a legal patchwork quilt of pension
elements. This does not necessarily have to be a negative (or for
that matter positive) element. Rather, it is a given fact. Devising
cross European legal typologies or legal models of pension systems
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

31. YVES

10.
30.
31.
32.
STEVENS

&

BEATRICE

SECTORPENSIOENEN 278 (Die Keure 2000).

VAN

BUGGENHOUT

(ed.),
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is therefore very difficult, if not impossible. Apart from the fact
that it is difficult, it is also certain that it has little to no legal
consequences. Legally, the various elements and techniques make
every Member State unique.3 2
Due to the quilt and the
multiplicity of solutions it has become almost impossible to give a
unique European answer to the various pension problems. The
national differences are often quite vast. As such, Europe can
definitely not be considered a monolith when it comes to
33
interpreting pension reforms.
Because of these variations among the Member States:
The consequences of the legal patchwork quilt lead to an evident
absence of a uniform "pension" notion within the EU. The debate on
what should be considered a pension is far-reaching. In most
Member States, there is for example a classical distinction between
the invalidity pensions and rest or survival pensions. Often, the
notion "pension" is not used as a legal synonym within one Member
34
State.
The legal patchwork gives an insight of the differences
between Member States.
The complexity of the systems is
enormous. At first view it might seem quite impossible that a
country such as the US with federal pension laws has a similar
patchwork. However, this is the truth. At first sight, nearly all
different elements can be found in various forms within the US.
The American and European patchwork on occupational and
private pensions are not so different. This will become more clear
in Part III when comparing the US and the EU. In order to be
able to make this comparison, it is first necessary to clarify the
European occupational pension mechanisms.

32. See Europe and Pensions: Confronting Risks and Policies, supra note 1,
at 35-36 (stating that:
A certain form of modesty - or even reticence - in explaining and
comparing pension systems is also required. An often-heard remark is
that economic data are difficult to compare. This is also true for a legal
comparison of pension systems. The same social goal can often be
reached by different means and it is therefore difficult to draw
conclusions that are internationally valid. Certain elements that seem
to be regular or standard within a Member State cannot be found in
other Member States at first sight. However, they might be found in
different elements or techniques.).
Id.

33. Most good analyses indicate that each county is clearly different. The
warning the WHO made in April 2007 to developing countries not to copycat
pension systems available in the west is therefore important. WHO specialist
Somnath Chatterji has argued that based on current ageing issues in the
developing world, other regions should not imitate European systems as they
will not be sustainable. The warning makes it clear that some people really

believe pension systems can be copied. This is obviously not the case.
34. See Europe and Pensions: Confronting Risks and Policies, supra note 1,
at 35.
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WITHOUT LEGAL COMPETENCE

The retirement systems in the United States and in Europe
are at crossroads. Government retirement plans such as Social
Security are no longer sufficient to guarantee enough retirement
funds for the current workforce both in the EU and US. The US
took a step in 2006 by installing the PPA 2006. Hence, employer
sponsored retirement plans are more than ever integral to proper
retirement planning for Americans, and these plans will continue
to become more important in the future. 35 The EU, however, has
not taken similar steps. The reason is that there is no real
European legal competence in the matter. This Section explains
how the European Union works when it comes to occupational
pensions
A. National Competences Leading to Desperate Disparity
The US is a constitutional federal republic comprising fifty
states and a federal district. The EU obviously is not. With regard
to occupational pensions (and pensions in general) the national
Member States of the EU retain full competence unless otherwise
decided. This means that the "federal" EU level can only interfere
when asked to do so by the 27 Member States. In principle, the EU
cannot take action on itself in these matters. This is called the
36
principle of subsidiarity.
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall
within its exclusive competence, the EU shall act only if and
insofar as the objectives of the intended action cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at the central
level, or at the regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at
Union level. 37 Formally, the principle of subsidiarity applies to
those areas where the EU does not have exclusive competence.
Furthermore, the principle delineates those areas where the EU
should and should not act. Social security (and thus pensions)
forms a domain of exclusive competence. In principle, the EU has

35. Craig Martin and Joshua Rafsky, The Pension Protection Act of 2006:

An Overview of Sweeping Changes in the Law Governing Retirement Plans, 40
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 843, 866 (2007).

36. Subsidiarity was established in EU law by the Treaty of Maastricht,
signed on February 7, 1992 and entered into force on November 1, 1993. The
present formulation is contained in Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community. See Consolidated Version of the Treating Establishing
the European Community art. 5, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33.
(consolidated version following the Treaty of Nice, which entered into force on
February 1, 2003 which provides that "[t]he Community shall act within the
limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives
assigned to it therein.").
37. Id.
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no right to interfere. When it comes to occupational pensions, the
EU can interfere on a limited basis because occupational pensions
are not considered to be exclusive social security. Occupational
pensions are legally also embedded in financial and economic law.
Statutory pensions are not.
This is very different from the US. The US implements
federal legislation. The most known legislative act for private
pensions is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
This federal law regulates most voluntarily(ERISA).38
established-and-maintained employee benefit plans in private
industry. 39 Such plans may be established and maintained by a
single employer, an employee organization, or jointly by one or
more such employers and an employee organization (known as
multi-employer or multiple employer plans).40 The creation of
such an act is just impossible at a European level due to (1) the
subsidiarity principle and (2) the quasi legal exclusive competence
on pensions for Member States. With Member States retaining
almost full competence, the EU level is seriously handicapped. The
consequence is that Member States reform their systems
irrespective of one another.
Hence the EU can best be described as a desperate disparity
The differences in
when it comes to occupational pensions.
no
models.
Member States
There
are
pensions are overwhelming.
have various pension systems, and Europe is confronted with an
enormous mix of systems consisting of diversity rules. 41 As Alain
Euezeby quite correctly states: "The social protection schemes of
the Member States of the European Union are amongst the most
developed in the world. But they are far from homogeneous. ''42 To
complicate matters even more: Over the last decade almost all EU
member States have undertaken systemic and parametric reforms
of their pension policies, many of which are still under process or
require further structural initiatives This has led to the inevitable
coexistence of different systems in place, even within the same
country, covering past acquired rights and new requirements.
The consequences of the desperate disparity are apparent. It
is almost impossible to do a decent study of all twenty-seven
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2007).
39. See P.L. 93-406 (1974) (codified as amended in various sections of Titles
26 and 29 of the United States Code) (discussing the framers' intent behind
The Employee-Retirement Income Security Act of 1974).
40. Kathyrn J. Kennedy, ERISA's Participant Benefit Statement
Requirements: Current Rules Under PPA 2006 and a Suggested Blueprint for
Future Interpretations,35 TAx MGM'T COMP. PLAN. J. 319 (2007).
41. See generally PrivatelyManaged Pension Provision,Report by the Social
Protection Committee (February 2005) [hereinafter "Privately Managed
at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment
available
Pension
Provision"],

_social/social-protection/docs/ private-pensions-en.pdf.
42. EUZEBY, supra note 8, at 25.
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Irrespective of the language
(occupational) pension systems.
problem (twenty-three official languages), 43 the technical legal
disparity is so immense, that it is quasi impossible to know the
exact impact of the legislation changes within Member States.
Since there is no true legal European competence in the matter,
there is no commonly developed database either. So to keep up
with the legal changes in the twenty seven different Member
It is no wonder that many
States is practically infeasible.
international analyses get bogged down in institutional, technical,
and legal detail, making it impossible to transfer policy lessons
between Member States.
The European Commission knows this problem very well:
Solid information on private pension schemes is essential for the
decision-making process for both the private sector and the
government. However the present situation is unsatisfactory at a
national level but even more so at the European level.44 It is not
It is also
only a problem of gathering legal information.
problematic to find comparable data on occupational pensions.
The data that exists should furthermore be taken with a lot of
precaution. Most data is not based on national data provided by
authorities. They are often based on surveys for just a few
Member States using distinct economic or sociological
45
parameters.

43. Frequently Asked Questions about the European Union's policy on
languages, available at http://europa.eu/languages/en/document/59.
44. Adequate and Sustainable Pensions Synthesis Report, 134 (2006),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment-sociallsocial-protection/docs/
2006/rapport-pensions-final en.pdf.
45. An example of such a limited data survey dates from November 2007
and was commissioned by the European Commission. Hewitt made the study.
In my opinion, this survey gives a wrong view on a lot matters because it
mainly focused on larger companies. Hence, policy options should not be
taken for granted. The information presented in the report relies largely on
the results of the ad hoc voluntary survey carried out among organizations,
which have established a pension scheme for their employees. Although the
structure of the survey has been designed to encompass the diverse practices
and types of scheme, the cross-country comparative analysis presented in this
section should be examined with caution as national variations may simply be
driven by structural systemic differences reflected into a specific business
practice. See generally, HEWITT ASSOCIATES, QUANTITATIVE OVERVIEW ON
SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION

PROVISION FINAL REPORT PREPARED

FOR THE

EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE GENERAL EMPL (Nov. 2007), available

at http://ec.europa.eu/employment-social/spsi/docs/social_protection
ecjreportjfinal nov_2007-en.pdf.

/2007/
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B. Limited European Legal Basis
The subsidiarity principle and the full competence of the
Member States might lead to the belief that nothing happens at
the European level. However, this is inaccurate. There are limited
elements of European occupational pension law. 46 These elements
can be found in the EU treaty, some directives and in policy
making documents (soft law).
1.

The European Treaty and Some EuropeanDirectives

In the Treaty establishing the European Community ("TEC"),
some articles can be found on the basis of which European
legislation (such as directives) has been installed. 47 These articles
deal with some basic values of the European union: the free
movement of people (art. 42 TEC), the freedom of establishment to
provide services (art. 43-49 TEC), the free movement of capital
(art. 56 TEC), the promotion of high standard regarding workers'
rights (art. 137 TEC) and the promotion of equal treatment of men
and women (art. 141 TEC).48
With relation to the portability of pension rights the free
movement of people, art. 42 TEC has proven to be important.
Directive 98/49/EC of 29 June 1998 on safeguarding the
supplementary pension rights of employed and self-employed
persons moving within the Community is based upon it. 49 The
directive ensures equal treatment of migrant workers and national
job changers regarding their occupational pension rights.50 The
directive only applies in a very limited number of cases and it only
guarantees equal treatment with national residents. So, if the
national residents are not protected, then there is no protection for
the migrant worker. In the current state of affairs, there is no real

46. With regard to statutory, state based pensions, there are specific
regulations. EU Regulation 1408/71 and Regulation 574/72 offer practical and
satisfactory solutions to most of the cross-border problems that may arise in
the field of social security. These Regulations do not harmonize but coordinate the social security schemes of EU Member States, i.e. they do not
replace the different national social security systems by a single European
scheme. Therefore, Member States are free to determine the details of their
own social security systems, including which benefits shall be provided, the
conditions of eligibility and the value of these benefits, as long as they adhere
to the basic principle of equality of treatment and non-discrimination. See
generally Social security schemes and free movement of persons: Basic
Regulation, availableat http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/ cha/cl0516.htm.
47. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J.
(C 325).
48. AMITSIS, supra note 5 at 103-06 (Theodoros Sakellaropoulos, Jos
Berghman, eds., Intersentia 2004).
49. Council Directive 98149/EC 1998 O.J. (L 209/46) 1 (EC).
50. Id.
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portability of occupational pension rights in the EU. A new
51
proposal of directive on portability was recently launched.
However, the proposal was altered in such a way that it is no
52
longer upheld as a real portability directive.
The articles 43 TEC and 49 TEC have played an important
role in creating a single market for occupational pension providers.
Several directives have established a single market for life
insurances. Three former Council directives related to insurance
matters have been amended by directive 2002/83/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 5 November 2002
concerning life insurance. 53 For example, the so-called IORP
directive is also based on the articles 43 and 49 TEC. The IORP
directive is directive 2003/41/EC on the activities and supervision
of institutions for occupational retirement provision and applies to
funded pension arrangements within a separate legal entity from
the employer .54 The IORP directive 2003/41 fits into the creation
of a single market for occupational pensions whereby all obstacles
have to be removed. The directive aims at establishing minimum
prudential standards, 55 defining the role and responsibilities of
supervisory authorities, 56 and proposing a qualitative approach to

51. Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliamentand the Council on
the improvement of portability of supplementary pension rights, COM (2005)
507 final (Oct. 20, 2005).
52. See id. (providing more information on the work and progress of the
directive). Originally the Commission had made an ambitious proposal which
would have enabled workers to enjoy true portability of their pensions. Many
people have expressed disappointment at the removal of provisions to assist
the transfer of pensions, but welcomed the report's clear commitment to
setting minimum standards for the access to pension rights and fair treatment
of dormant rights.
53. 2002 O.J. (L 345) 1-51. The three former directives are 79/267/EEC of
March 5, 1979 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of direct
life assurance; 90/619/EEC of November 8, 1990 that pertaining to direct life
assurance, laying down provisions to facilitate the effective exercise of freedom
to provide services and amending Directive 79/267/EEC; and 92/96/EEC of
November 10, 1992 corresponding to direct life assurance and amending
Directives 79/267/EEC and 90/619/EEC).
This
54. Council Directive 2003/41, art. 2, 2003 O.J. (L 235) (EC).
separation guarantees that the assets are safeguarded in the interests of
The
members and beneficiaries in the event of employer bankruptcy.
Directive limits the types of arrangements that can be IORPs. In particular,
the following are excluded: social security arrangements, funds that operate
on a pay-as-you go basis, funds under which employees have no legal rights to
benefits and book reserves.
55. Council Directive 2003/41, 2003 O.J. (L 235) (EC). The Directive sets
out a number of safeguards for the protection of members. The Directive
requires that an IORP is registered in a national register, is effectively run by
persons of good repute, has properly constituted rules and that IORPs
technical provisions (basically the pension scheme liabilities) are computed
and certified by an actuary or other specialist in the field.
IORPs are supervised and regulated by national "competent
56. Id.
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investment rule, according to which investment portfolio
management should comply with the principles of diversification,
security, and quality (not uniform quantitative requirements).
The directive is also designed to allow cross-border management of
occupational pension schemes - an institution in one Member
State would be able to manage company pension schemes in other
Member States. 57 The IORP directive allows mutual recognition of
A mutually recognized
Member States' supervisory regimes.
pension provider will be able to manage the pension schemes of
firms located in other Member States while applying the
58
prudential rules of the Member State in which it is established.
This is called the home-country control. It is believed that bigger
multinational companies would benefit from the directive by
soaking up additional costs of running pensions funds in different
The directive ensures that the social and labour
countries.
legislation of the host Member States (i.e. those applicable to the
relationship between the sponsoring undertaking and the
members) will continue to apply. The directive does not intend to
interfere directly with national pension schemes. An IORP is
subject to supervision by the competent authorities of the host

authorities." The competent authorities will be able to carry out inspections
and intervene to help protect members' rights. The competent authorities are
empowered to carry out inspections into compliance with the supervisory rules
and where necessary are given powers of intervention, including the levying of
fines against the IORP and persons running the IORP. Competent authorities
can require IORPs to provide various items of information: investment policy
principles, annual reports and accounts, all documents necessary for the
purposes of supervision, such as internal interim reports, actuarial valuations
and assumptions, asset-liability studies, evidence of consistency with
investment policy principles, evidence that contributions have been paid as
planned and auditors' reports.
57. Id. The directive enables IORPs to accept sponsorship by, and run a
pension scheme for, a company located in other member states. Consequently
and in the long run, impediments to trans-national membership will be
removed throughout the EU (part of the free movement of workers). At
present, occupational pension providers, such as pension funds, operate for the
most part only in the Member State in which they are established. See Gael
Coron, Retraite par Capitalisation et Union Europdenne: Retour sur la
Directive Institutions de RetraiteProfessionnelle,43 REVUE DE L'IRES 3 (2003)
(describing the history and origin of the directive).
58. Id. Mutual recognition of pension sponsoring across Member States is
the basis of the Directive. An IORP authorized within one single Member
State can deploy its activities throughout the European Union. A single
license suffices (i.e. the European passport). An IORP wanting to accept
sponsorship from a foreign employer must obtain authorisation of the
competent (supervisory) authority (or regulator) located in its own country
(the home state). It must go through a notification procedure informing this
competent authority. This involves providing the host Member State(s). This
means the Member State where the sponsoring company (or employer is
located); the name of the sponsoring undertaking (employer); and the main
characteristics of the scheme to be operated for the employer.
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State in respect of the host States' social and labour laws relevant
to occupational pensions.5 9 A major question is: what does this
60
notion of social and labor legislation mean?
Article 56 TEC prohibits restrictions on the free movement of
capital. The IORP directive facilitates the free movement of
capital
by
abolishing
uniform
quantitative
investment
requirements.
Article 137 TEC stands for the promotion of high standards
regarding workers' rights. Two directives have been based on the
article. These are directives 80/987/EEC of 20 October 1980 (on
the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the
protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their
employer) and 2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 (on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the
safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of
undertakings, businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses).
The directives require Member States to take the necessary
measures to protect workers' supplementary pension rights.
Based on article 141 TEC plenty of pension jurisprudence on
the promotion of equal treatment of men and women has been
developed.
These court cases have partially already been
transformed into council directives. Yet, Directive 79/7/EEC of 19
December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle
of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social
security, allows discrimination regarding the retirement age and
survivors' pensions, but calls for them to be phaged out. Article
141 TEC requires equal treatment with regard to occupational
schemes which are regarded as pay. This is reflected in Directive
86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle
of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social
security schemes amended by Council Directive 96/97/EC of 20
December 1996.

59. Id. Should irregularities occur, the host State authority shall
immediately inform the home State authority. The home State authority, in
co-ordination with the host State regulator, will take the necessary action to
rectify matters. If the home State authority is unable to stop the breach in the
host State's requirements, the host State authority, after informing the home
State authority, must take steps to prevent or penalize further irregularities including preventing the scheme from operating in the host State.
60. On this topic two studies have been written. YVES STEVENS, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL MATRIX ON THE MEANING OF "NATIONAL SOCIAL AND
LABOUR LEGISLATION" IN DIRECTIVE 2003/41/EC WITH REGARD TO FIVE
MEMBER STATES (BELGIUM / FRANCE / GERMANY / ITALY / NETHERLANDS)

(European Association of Paritarian Institutions AEIP) (2006); YVES STEVENS,
THE MEANING OF "NATIONAL SOCIAL AND LABOUR LEGISLATION" IN DIRECTIVE
2003/1/EC ON THE ACTIVITIES AND SUPERVISION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
OCCUPATIONAL RETIREMENT PROVISION (European Association of Paritarian

Institutions AEIP) (2004).
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2. European Policy Objectives
Compared to the very small European legal basis on
occupational pensions, a lot of work has been put in developing
ideas on how Europe should evolve in pension matters. This is
logical because pensions are embedded in and part of economic
structures. The EU is an economic structure. Pension schemes
influence the national economies.
So logically, most pension
policies are embedded in the general economic policy of the EU.
Many policy makers have created European pension policies both
in a general way but also specifically for occupational pensions.
a.

General Pension Policy

Countless reports and papers indicate the European economic
and demographic challenges related to ageing.6 1 In most Member
States, pensions expenditure is expected to rise significantly from
2015 onwards, giving rise to concern about the capacity of future
pensions to ensure decent living standards for the retired and
financial sustainability of pension systems. Nevertheless, aging
does not imply the financial collapse of pension systems. 62 Then
again, it will certainly lead to increased spending pressures,
notably in the areas of pensions, health and long-term care. The
overall challenge is how to ensure that the additional financial
obligations can be met.
The EU has formulated multiple objectives and policies
throughout the years in order to tackle these known pension
problems. Currently all Member States agreed on eleven common
EU objectives designed to secure the future of their pension
systems. 63 The eleven objectives refer to three chapters. Under
the first chapter entitled "Adequacy," three objectives can be found
namely: (1) prevent social exclusion in old age; (2) allow people to
maintain their living standard; and (3) promote solidarity between
and within generations. The financial sustainability of pension
systems is the second chapter whereby the objectives are to (4)
raise employment levels; (5) extend working lives; (6) ensure
61. Budgetary Challenges Posed by Ageing Populations: The Impact on
Public Spending on Pensions, Health and Long Term Care for the Elderly and
Possible Indicators of the Long-Term Sustainability of Public Finances (Oct.
24, 2001) (explaining one of the EPC's more accurate reports); Sheetal K.

Chand and Albert Jaeger, Aging Populations and Public Pension Schemes,
WASHINGTON, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 42 (1996); ORGANISATION
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, MaintainingProsperity in

an Ageing Society, OECD OBSERVER, (June 1998).
62. Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European
Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee, Supporting National
Strategies for Safe and Sustainable Pensions through an Integrated Approach,
at 3, COM (2001) 362 final (July 3, 2001).

63. Adequate and Sustainable Pensions Synthesis Report, supra note 44
(explaining and developing these eleven objectives).
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sustainable pensions in a context of sound public finances; (7)
adjust benefits and contributions so as to share the financial
consequences of ageing in a balanced way between the
generations; and (8) ensure that private pension provision is
adequate and financially sound.
Furthermore, the pension
schemes should respond to changing needs (third chapter).
Pensions should therefore, (9) adapt to more flexible employment
and career patterns; (10) meet the aspirations for greater equality
of women and men; and (11) make pension systems more
transparent and demonstrate their ability to meet the challenges.
These eleven objectives indicate common policy options and refer
to a wanted integrated and comprehensive pension approach.
Although they are but common policy options and thus have no
legal binding force on the policy level they play the role of mind
changer.
The major breakthrough in defining the eleven abovementioned objectives by the European Council is that pension
policies should take a comprehensive and integrated vision. All
pension and retirement types form a whole. There is an increasing
awareness of the need to get a complete picture of the future
challenges to pension systems and the common action that needs
to be taken to meet these challenges. Depending on the personal
(working) background of an individual, a mixture of retirement
provisions or other incomes is required. If the statutory pension
provides a sufficient level of replacement income in order to
maintain an equivalent living standard during retirement, then
there is no need for other retirement incomes. In this respect, the
comprehensive and integrated approach requires a form of
coordination meaning that all forms of retirement provisions
should be taken into account in order to determine and evaluate
the height of the pensioner's income.
b.

Occupational Pension Policy

Occupational pensions have been on the policy agenda for a
long time within the EU. Over the years, many policy options have been proposed. Most of the statements done by the European
Commission, up to 2000, could create the impression that
occupational pensions were less a matter of creating a future-proof
pensions policy demonstrating social solidarity. Rather, these
statemens could be interpreted as addressing budget and financial
policy aspects. In other words, until 2000 the idea lived that
occupational pensions are associated with a strengthening of the
finance and capital markets rather than associated with social
policy. 64 Issues such as solidarity and social equality seemed to be
64. Historically important years include:
1990: Proponents plead for the European Commission to require Europe-wide
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restrained into the background. Only recently, the commission
took a more "social" view upon occupational pensions. 65 In its
latest report "Adequate and sustainable pensions: synthesis
report" of 2006, the European Commission considered occupational
66
pensions as a part of social policy.
This change in the way occupational pensions are perceived,
pertain to two general policy objectives. There is first of all
objective 8 "making sure that private pension provision is
adequate and financially sound" and secondly there is objective 9
stating that "pensions should adapt to more flexible employment
and career patterns." 67 These two objectives are part of a specific
European process called OMC.
3. OMC and OccupationalPensions
In 2001, the European Council recognized that there could be
significant benefits by enhancing dialogue and cooperation on
issues related to the reform of pension systems. Thus, it endorsed
the eleven common objectives of adequacy, financial sustainability
and adaptability. The council also decided on a working method,

regulation on pension funds because of the financial market.
1991: The European commission puts the first principles on supplementary
pensions forward.
Supplementary Social Security Schemes: The Role of
Occupational Pension Schemes in the Social Protection of Workers and their
Implications for Freedom of Movement, SEC (91) 1332 final, Brussels (July 22,
1991), http://aei.pitt.edu/ 3458/01/000609_1.pdf.
1998: The Commission's communication of October 28, 1998 on Financial
Services stated that the framework contains proposals to complete the
integration of financial markets in the Union. Commission of European
Communities, Financial Services: Building a Framework for Action (1998),
http://ec.europa.eulinternal-market/finances/docs/ actionplanindex/fs-en.pdf.
1999: The Commission Communication: "Towards a single market for
supplementary pensions" is the first very important green paper in this field.
Communication from the Commission, Towards a Single Market for
Supplementary Pensions, Results of the Consultations on the Green Paper on
Supplementary Pensions in the Single Market, COM(1999) 134 final (Nov. 5,
1999), available at http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/cha/ c 10523.htm.
2000: Report of the Economic Policy Committee concerning the future
direction of pension reform. ECONOMIC POLICY COMMITTEE, Progress Report
to the Ecofin Council on the Impact of Ageing Populations on Public Pension
Systems, (Nov. 6, 2000), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance
/epc/documents/2000/epc-ageing-report en.pdf.
2002: First draft joint report by the commission and the council on adequate
and sustainable pensions. In this report occupational pensions were taken into
account. The latest report dates from 2006. Adequate and Sustainable
Pensions Synthesis Report, supra note 44.
65. Draft Joint Report by the Commission and the Council on Adequate and
Sustainable
Pensions
5
(March
3,
2003),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eulemployment-social/spsildocs/social-protectionlcs7l65-03_e
n.pdf.
66. Adequate and Sustainable Pensions Synthesis Report, supra note 44.
67. Id. at 136-40.
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which is known as the open method of coordination ("OMC").6 s In
this method Member States are required to answer to specific
issues related to the eleven objectives in a common framework.
The national answers and comments are gathered in National
Strategy Reports. Because every Member State has to answer the
common questions, valuable comparative information can be
examined. 69 The idea is to learn from one another. Basically, the
OMC gives a framework to a mutual learning process, including a
periodical monitoring of the progress made by each Member State
on the basis of commonly agreed and defined indicators. The
national strategy reports should contain all relevant data, which
will help to assess progress towards the broad common objectives.
In 2002, the first wave of National Strategy Reports ("NSRs")
described how the fifteen Member States intended to meet these
objectives. On the basis of these NSRs, the Commission and the
Council adopted a Joint Report on adequate and sustainable
pensions in March 2003. The 2003 Joint Report concluded that
"Most Member States see pension reform as a continuous process
rather than a one-off, discreet event. The momentum behind
reform process to secure the sustainability of adequate pensions
must be maintained."70 The Council requested progress to be
presented in 2006 and for the new Member States to be included. 71
A second round of NSRs was thus presented by the Member States
in the summer of 2005. The NSRs were discussed in a peer review
in mid-September 2005, involving the Social Protection Committee
("SPC") and the Economic Policy Committee ("EPC"). All the
results are presented in a report of 2006.72 The main conclusions
were:
there has been substantial progress in reforming pension systems;
disincentives to work longer have been reduced and incentives
strengthened; links between contributions and benefits have been
tightened; life expectancy has been further taken into account in
pension systems; the provision of supplementary pensions has been
promoted; and guaranteed minimum pensions have been increased.
For the first time in European history occupational and
private pensions were taken into account for examining pension
68. Id. at 134.
69. See Guidance Note for Preparing National Strategy Reports on Social
Protection
and
Social
Inclusion,
2008-2010,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment-social/spsi/docs/socialinclusion/2008/080207_
guidance -note nsrs cln en.pdf.
70. Adequate and SustainablePensions Synthesis Report, supra note 44.
71. Id. See CIA - The World Factbook, https://www.cia.govflibrary/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (explaining that in 2004 Cyprus,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and
Czech Republic joined the EU). Furthermore, Bulgaria and Romania joined
the EU in 2007. Id.
72. Adequate and Sustainable Pensions Synthesis Report, supra note 44.
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policies. The 2006 report holds a specific chapter entitled "Secure
private pensions complementing or replacing partially public
pension provision."
In this chapter some main European
conclusions can be drawn:
eMember States place greater emphasis on the contribution of
private funded provision than before. Several Member
States see a role for the private pension provision as part of
the total pension provision. This has traditionally been the
case in some Member States (like DK, NL and UK).
*Several Member States see a role for the private pension
provision as part of the total pension provision. This has
traditionally been the case in some Member States (like
DK, NL and UK).
@The importance of private pension provision has essentially
been increased by the introduction of a funded tier of
statutory schemes in a number of Member States like in
SE, PL, HU, EE, LV, LT, and SK.
eSome Member States have increased provisions for
occupational or private schemes that complement public
pensions (DE, IT, AT).
@In all but a few Member States, the public pay-as-you-go
pension schemes are expected to remain the principal
source of income of pensioners. The trend towards a
broader use of privately-managed pension provision does
not allow public policy to retreat from the area.
oMonitoring and regulating private pension provision is
becoming an important and complex task for public policy.
*Transparency and competitive
markets
intermediaries should be promoted.

for

financial

*If private pensions are to provide retirement incomes for
people with lower incomes it is therefore essential that
Member States invest in good governance structures for
them.
*There is a debate in some Member States about making
private savings mandatory, in particular if a major part of
the pension provision should be based on private saving (as
is the case in many new Member States).
*As far as private pensions are based on a wider use of
voluntary private pensions, they are generally used more
frequently by higher income groups.
*It is important for Member States to monitor whether the
actual development of private pension provision matches
needs, by assessing levels of coverage and benefits and
their distribution by age and socio-economic status.
sPrivately-managed schemes have to operate at a sufficiently
high level of security and efficiency. Rules on acceptable
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investment risks and prudent assumptions about future
returns are important safeguards if their implementation is
well-enforced and monitored, while efficiency also means
ensuring that administrative charges are kept low.
*The translation of individual accounts into safe and secure
annuities will become more and more important, in
particular for the regimes recently introduced that will
begin to provide first, partial benefits in a few years and
often before the end of the decade (like in PL, EE, HU, LV,
73
LT or SK).
Basically, the open method of co-ordination (OMC) is a
mutual learning process. Such a process of learning from and with
other Member States is very familiar to lawyers. They are used to
work that involves comparative cross-country legal analyses. So,
it would be wrong to present the basic phenomenon of crossnational benchmarking as recently booming.
It is only the
framework that has received a boom. It is essential to note that
there are no "best practices" in OMC. There are only "most
appropriate practices for specific national circumstances." Thus,
there are not only numerous legal barriers to the transfer of
practices.
Member States also have different demographic
prospects, pension systems and economic environments for their
pension systems. That is why it is impossible to make an overall
hit parade of national pension policies. With the OMC, you cannot
rank the Member States according to a pension beauty contest. In
this manner the OMC can provide innovative policy options for
7
domestic policy-makers without losing respect for local diversity. 4
C. No Real EuropeanImpact
The list of common European realizations is far from
impressive. At a European level, there is a lot of talk about
pensions but little real action. Guidelines and indicators are
formulated at regular intervals but without any real impact on the
national pension policies.
The reality is clear: Europe is
confronted with twenty seven different member states when it
comes to technical pension issues. These wide national differences
are mainly the result of the historical, demographic, economic,
political and ideological diversity within the European Union.
Furthermore, the little that has been done in Europe is
seriously questioned. There is an increasing criticism toward the
European Law field due to the lack of so-called social justice.
There is even "[a] number of academics that have formed a Study

73. See infra note 110 and accompanying text (providing abbreviations for
the EU's Member States).
74. Anton Hemerijck, Deepening Social Europe Through Open Coordination, in BELGISCH TIJsCHRIFr VOOR SOCIALE ZEKERHEID 461 (2002).
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Group on Social Justice in European Private Law ... [t]he Group
wishes for a European contract law that respects cultural diversity
and at the same time introduces regulatory techniques that enjoy
legitimacy in a multi level pluralistic policy." 75 Without any doubt,
76
the social quality of Europe as a whole can indeed be questioned.
IV. COMPARING THE

EU AND THE US

A full comparison between the occupational private pension
laws in Europe and the US would take more than one doctoral
thesis. This article therefore focuses only on some very specific
topics allowing some comparative lessons. The issues retained are:
vesting, coverage, benefit design, portability and information.
Clearly many other topics could be covered as well. Topics
such as funding, 77 taxation, benefit pay-out, 78 the legal powers of
the supervisory authorities, and the role of the trade unions are
definitely worth examining.
However, with regard to the
comparative lessons (part IV) the five chosen themes seem
appropriate.
Due to the disparity within Europe this comparison is
sometimes more based on a comparison between the 27 European
Member States and the US. For the US, this article looks at the
various topics with much emphasis on the PPA 2006. 79 "The

75. Ole Lando, Liberal, Social and "Ethical"Justice in European Contract
law, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 817, 819-21 (2006) (demonstrating that the
Study Group has defined quite a few parameters examining this kind of
justice).
76. Jan Baars, Kees Knipscheer, Fleur Thomese & Alan Walker,
Conclusions: Towards Social Quality in Europe, in THE SOCIAL QUALITY OF
EUROPE 297-309 (Wolfgang Beck et al. eds. 1997).
77. Sarah D. Burt, Note, Pension Protection? A Comparative Analysis of
Pension Reform in the United States and United Kingdom, 18 IND. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 189, 219-22 (2008) (comparing differences between the US and
EU Member States). For example, in the US all plans are funded. In the EU
there is a huge variety. There are also European occupational pensions based
on PAYG.
78. See Monika Bulter, Should You Take a Lump or Annutize? Results
from Swiss Pension Funds (Oct 5, 2005), available at http://www.cergeei.cz/pdf/events/papers/ 060330_t.pdf (demonstrating that both in the US and
the EU the accumulated capital at retirement is sometimes either paid as a
lump sum or converted into a pension). National legislation or scheme
regulations in Europe define the possibilities. Id.; Emma C. Eriksson, Note,
The Pension ProtectionAct of 2006: Is it too Late to Save TraditionalPlans? 41
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 133, 147 (2007). In the US, the PPA 2006 changed the
funding rules quite strongly. Under the Pension Act, most pension funds must
be completely funded within seven years, and "at-risk" plans must comply at
an accelerated pace. See id. at 148 (referring to the Pension Protection Act of
2006 § 501). Furthermore, the Pension Act mandates that underfunded plans
pay higher premiums; disclose the plan's funding status to plan participants;
and produce more accurate actuarial plan assessments. Id.
79. This act was signed into law on August 17, 2006. Pension Protection
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primary focus of the Act is to stabilize pension plans and ensure
they are fully funded to avoid problems, such as those associated
with the collapse of Enron. Considering that approximately 44
million Americans are covered by traditional pension plans, to say
that the Act is far-reaching is a vast understatement." 80
Congress approved the new funding rules in response to a
growing alarm about the risk posed to the retirement security of
US workers and to US taxpayers by the magnitude of the liability
from underfunded defined benefit pension plans. The use of
unrealistic assumptions to value plan assets and liabilities,
pension laws that deterred -

or even prohibited -

adequate

funding, and weak economic conditions all contributed to the
problem. 81
According to Martin and Rafsky the PPA 2006 also fulfills a
hidden agenda. Specifically, "[o]ne of the PPA's main purposes is
to eliminate defined benefit plan underfunding by revamping the
old rules governing defined benefit funding." Further, "[o]ther
major, and intended consequences of the PPA... are the
encouragement and promotion of the use of defined contribution
plans, as well as the legitimization of controversial cash balance
82
plans."
A. Vesting
Legally, vesting is an important issue in both the US and the
EU. Vesting gives an immediately secured right of present or
future enjoyment. A vested right to an asset cannot be taken away
by any third party, even though one may not yet possess the asset.
Both in the EU and the US a vested right is quite absolute as a
right.
The funding that goes with the vesting entitles the
employee to a kind of ownership on the assets.
1. Us
In the US, vesting provisions secure for an employee a
nonforfeitable right to pension benefits when changing jobs or
otherwise ending employment before becoming eligible for a
pension. Employees in the US always have a non-forfeitable right
to their own contributions. So the vesting problem is only a topic
for the employers' contributions.
Before ERISA in 1974, some defined benefit pension plans
required decades of service before an employee's benefit became

Act, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780.
80. Douglas L. Lineberry, The Pension Protection Act of 2006: Wide
Ranging Changes to ERISA Not Limited to Just Employee Benefits, 19 S. C.
LAW. 16, 16 (2007).
81. Id. at 18.
82. Martin, supra note 35, at 843.
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vested. It was not unusual for a plan to provide no benefit to an
employee who left employment before retirement (age 65 or
sometimes age fifty five), regardless of the length of the employee's
service. Historically, virtually all vesting provisions were in two
forms--deferred full (or "cliff') and deferred graded (or
"graduated")-both of which required the employee to meet service
conditions. When conditions for deferred full vesting are satisfied,
all accrued benefits are receivable at a later date. Under graded
vesting, an initial percentage of accrued benefits are first earned,
and the vested percentage increases as additional services are
credited. ERISA incorporated both cliff and graded vesting in
establishing vesting rules, but minimum age requirements (apart
from a minimum age for plan participation) and deferred partial
grading were not permitted. The law also prescribed minimum
vesting schedules, and it set a maximum of ten years for cliff
vesting schedules.
Generally, a plan may require a person to reach age twenty
one to be eligible to participate in the plan and to have a year of
service. The waiting period for workers age twenty one or older
cannot be more than one year of service, unless the plan provides
immediate full vesting. In that case, a waiting period of up to two
years may be applied.
As of 2007, employees' benefits in a defined benefit pension
plan must become vested at one hundred percent after five years
or under a seven-year graded-vesting schedule (twenty percent a
year for each year of service beginning with the third year of
service and ending with one hundred percent after seven years).
Under the PPA 2006, employer contributions made after 2006
to a defined contribution plan must become vested at one hundred
percent after three years or under a six-year graded-vesting
schedule (twenty- percent a year for each year of service beginning
with the second year of service and ending with one hundred
percent after six years). "While this sounds like a significant
impact on businesses, market research suggests that more than
eighty five percent of current 401(k) plans provide for vesting that
is at least as favorable as the new provisions of the Act."8 3 Full
vesting must always occur when a member reaches the plan's
normal retirement age, which usually is age sixty five for defined
benefit plans, or if the plan is wound up. Different rules apply
with respect to employer contributions made before 2007.
2. EU
To vest an occupational pension, various systems exist
throughout the European Union. Three sets of conditions are
clearly present in most systems: (1) citizenship, (2) number of
83. Lineberry, supra note 80, at 16.
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worked years and (3) amount of paid contributions into the
pension scheme. Most analyses start from one of these three
parameters in describing the acquisition condition of pension
systems.8 4 However, when looking at the pension legislation in
various Member States it becomes obvious that the three systems
have been used simultaneously in various stages of different
85
schemes. Diversity rules.
Instead of looking at the twenty seven different Member
States, some examples make the diversity apparent:
*Most schemes in the UK are subject to statutory vesting
requirements. These require vesting periods of no more
than 2 years, reducing to 3 months if a cash transfer is
chosen. A significant proportion of UK based schemes have
either no vesting period or a short period of between one
and six months.
eIn Spain most qualified pension schemes are subject to
statutory vesting conditions. These require immediate and
full vesting independently of the type of scheme. This rule
is also applicable to insurance contracts where premium is
considered taxable income for participating employees. On
the other hand, no specific statutory requirements apply in
insurance contracts where premium is not considered
taxable income for participating employees. A proportion of
Spanish-based schemes have either no vesting period or a
short period mainly in a range between one and twenty four
months. For Defined Benefit schemes longer vesting
conditions can apply.
eIn Ireland nearly all schemes are subject to a statutory vesting
period of not more than 2 years. A significant proportion of
Ireland-based schemes either have no vesting period or a
short period of between one and six months.
*Most German schemes are subject to statutory vesting
requirements. These require vesting periods of 5 years for
schemes that are sponsored by employers and no vesting
period for schemes that are sponsored by employees.
Employers are free to voluntarily shorten the 5-year vesting
period but hardly ever do so.
oln France rights under defined benefits schemes cannot be
vested before retirement age without losing the favorable
tax regime that allows tax deductibility. Benefits under
defined contributions schemes and collective retirement
saving plans are fully vested.
It is legally inaccurate to state that most occupational pension
84. See WHITEHOUSE, supra note 10, at 5-9 (providing an analysis of
pension systems).
85. See Privately Managed Pension Provision, supra note 41, at 6

(demonstrating that it is difficult to assign a system certain parameters).
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schemes in Europe base their acquisition condition on paid
contributions. For example, an increasing number of occupational
pension schemes of Eastern European Member States require
European citizenship. In the Dutch system, the working years are
a more important acquisition condition than the paid
With some of the book reserves systems in
contributions.
Germany, the working years condition is clearly the most
important condition.
Another interesting element is related to the waiting periods.
Here, also, there is a lot of diversity in Europe.
*In Belgium the law requires employees of twenty five or older
to be immediately affiliated to pension schemes. Waiting
periods can only be applied to employees younger than
twenty five.
eIn the UK, Ireland, France and Spain most schemes have very
few employees in waiting periods. This is because most
schemes have a short or no waiting period and have a low
or no minimum age.
*For the Polish qualified pension plans there is a minimum
waiting period of three months (established by the EPP
Act), and written in the company agreement. For nonqualified plans, the waiting period is defined by the
contract governing the plan.
*In the Netherlands there is a limitation of the waiting period
to two months.
B. Coverage and Anti-Discrimination
A main question with regard to private or occupational
pensions in both Europe and the US is: who is covered?
Additionally, what percentage of the population enjoys a private
occupational pension? The topic is strongly debated in the EU and
the US alike. The coverage rate is legally linked to the possibility
to discriminate in plans. Who can be left out?
1. Us
The US pension system is mainly employer-based and it is
voluntary. "That is, nothing in the law requires an employer to
offer any pension at all. Although many employers may feel
competitive pressures to offer some retirement vehicle for their
employees, many do not." 6 Moreover, "it has been reported that
over seventy one million of the 153 million working Americansalmost half-worked for an employer sponsoring no retirement
plan."8 7 The PPA 2006 provides in part that:
86. Susan J. Stabile, Is it Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based
Pension System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 305, 321-22 (2007).
87. Id.
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rules for testing defined benefit plans and hybrid plans (which
specify contributions to an account like a defined contribution plan
but guarantee final benefits like a defined benefit plan) to determine
Tax
whether they violate the age discrimination provisions of the
88
Code, ERISA and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Sponsoring employers have quite a lot of flexibility in
determining who will be covered under a plan and can create
different plans for different groups.
Originally, if an employer offered a DB plan, the participation
was automatic and thus compulsory for covered employees.
Employers were not required to cover all employees, but they
needed to meet minimum employee coverage and nondiscrimination rules. With the decline of DB plans a lot has
changed however. Participation to DC plans may be automatic or
voluntary for covered employees depending on the type of defined
contribution plan and/or plan rules.
However, in order to receive a tax-qualified status, however, a
nonconcerning
plan must satisfy legal requirements
Coverage and
discrimination in contributions and benefits.
participation must not discriminate in favor of highly compensated
employees. In this regard, the fiscal rules are used as a means to
determine the discrimination rules.
The US has always considered taxation a means of
This is due to historical
influencing the coverage rate.
underpinnings.
Private pension plans were also subject to nondiscrimination rules,
which limited the employer's ability to skew plan benefits in favor of
highly compensated employees. In testing for nondiscrimination,
however, employers were allowed to claim full credit for Social
Security benefits by 'integrating' them with employer-provided
pension benefits. As a result, while Social Security benefits were
weighed in favor of low-income workers, private plans channeled
benefits to high-income workers, who stood to gain the most from
89
tax incentives.
There was a kind of social equivalence between low income
workers with full social security benefits and high income workers
with private pensions. Social Security benefits were tilted in favor
of low-income workers due to a progressive benefit formula, which
produced a declining ratio of benefits to pre-retirement income for
higher-income workers. However, social security benefits have
declined and ERISA has created the plans under section 401(k).
The difference between high and low income workers faded and
the high income workers gained a lot by the changes.

88. Lineberry, supra note 80, at 16.

89. Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Social Security Reform:
Lessons from PrivatePensions, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 297, 298 (2007).
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Consequently, the effects of using taxation as a means to
streamline affiliation are limited. 90 Burke and Mc Couch give a
clear qualification:
As the attractiveness of qualified plans has diminished, many
employers have resorted to nonqualified deferred compensation
arrangements to remunerate highly paid employees. In general, a
nonqualified plan consists of the employer's unfunded, unsecured
promise to pay pension benefits to the employee in the future. Both
the employer's deduction and the employee's inclusion are deferred
until the benefits are actually paid. Even if the employee and
employer could earn the same pre-tax rate of return on an
equivalent investment, deferral is advantageous to the employee
whenever the employer's marginal tax rate is lower than the
employee's. The principal attraction of nonqualified plans is that
they are exempt from the regulatory requirements associated with
qualified plans. As a result, private pension plans have evolved
toward a two-tier system, with qualified plans for the rank and file
and nonqualified plans for highly compensated employees. 91
Not surprisingly, those who lack pension coverage tend to be
lower-income employees. "Because the system is driven by tax
benefits, employers whose workers are less well-paid, hence less
tax-sensitive, tend not to offer pension plans." 92 "Lack of coverage
93
is particularly an issue for employees of small employers."
"Moreover, that an employer sponsors some pension plan does not
mean that all of the employees of that employer have pension
coverage." "Employers are free to design their plans so as to
exclude certain categories of employees, so long as the plan does
not run afoul of the Code's prohibitions against discrimination in
94
favor of highly-compensated employees, and many do so."
"Additionally, employers are able to effectively exclude part-time
90. Id. at 300.
In 1986, as part of a comprehensive revision of the tax code, Congress
imposed new limits on contributions and benefits for highly
compensated employees as well
as stricter coverage and
nondiscrimination requirements. These changes were intended both to
encourage broader pension coverage and benefits for low-and moderateincome workers and to limit revenue losses from the tax expenditure for

qualified plans.

The efficacy of the tax subsidy, however, was

undermined by declining marginal tax rates, and the attraction of
qualified plans was reduced by restrictions on contributions and benefits
for highly compensated employees. Given the voluntary nature of
qualified plans, it is hardly surprising that employers responded to the

1986 legislation not by expanding pension coverage or broadening
benefits among the rank and file but rather by searching for more

valuable alternative forms of compensation.
Id. at 300-01.
91. Id. at 301.
92. Stabile, supra note 86, at 322.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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employees by virtue of their ability to exclude from plan
participation employees who do not work 1000 hours in a year and
many have, in fact, increased the number of part-time employees,
95
thereby reducing their benefit costs."
"Finally, a number of employers have also effectively excluded
workers from coverage by having certain work performed by
independent contractors. Since independent contractors are, by
definition, not employees, they do not receive the benefit of any
protection from ERISA."96
The conclusion on the US coverage is quite clear: "[t]he
private pension system may be failing to accomplish its goals.
While the nondiscrimination rules may have helped to limit tax
expenditures for highly paid employees, they have done little to
improve qualified plan coverage for the rank and file."97 "Indeed,
private pensions provide a negligible amount of retirement income
98
for employees in the bottom 40 percent of the income scale."
Moreover, the growth of 401(k) plans is unlikely to result in
expanded coverage. "A 401(k) plan puts the decision whether to
participate in the plan in the hands of the employee. Studies
consistently find that upwards of one-quarter of employees eligible
to participate do not do so." 99 Further, "lower income employees those least likely to have private sources of retirement savings are less likely to participate in a 401(k) plan." 100
Congress was aware of the coverage problem when passing
the PPA 2006. The PPA 2006 introduced automatic enrollment
features.
"[E]mployers may now unilaterally enroll [new]
employees in 401(k) retirement plans" and set default contribution

95. Id. at 322-23.
96. Id. at 323.
97. Burke, supra note 89, at 301.
98. See also Daniel I. Halperin & Alicia H. Munnell, Assuring Retirement
Income
for
All
Workers,
2
(2000),
available
at
http://www2.bc.edu/-munnell/wp-2000-05.pdf
(indicating that "[iun 1996,
pensions accounted for only 3 percent of the retirement income of the lowest
quintile of the over 65 income distribution and 7 percent of the second-lowest
quintile."); Nat'l Acad. of Soc. Ins., Uncharted Waters: Paying Benefits from
IndividualAccounts in FederalRetirement Policy 31-32 (Virginia P. Reno et al.
eds., 2005), available at http:/l www.nasi.org/usr docfUnchartedWaters_
Report.pdf (explaining that the distribution of retirement savings in defined
contribution plans and IRAs is similarly skewed; in 2001, the median account
balance for families in the lowest two quintiles was zero).
99. See Stabile, supra note 86, at 311 ("Most workers who do participate in
401(k) plans fail to contribute enough to accumulate sufficient retirement
savings."). Furthermore, "[o]nly about ten percent of participants contribute
the maximum amount permitted under the Code, and those who do are likely
to be the highest income employees."). Id. at 311-12. Additionally, "[o]nly one
percent of workers earning under $60,000 made the maximum annual
contribution to their defined contribution plan in 2004." Id. at 312.
100. Id. at 311.
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levels starting at three percent of the employee's gross income.101
This automatic enrollment means that an eligible person is
automatically enrolled unless he protests.10 2 "Employees who do
not wish to participate must opt out of the plan ... considering
that one-third of eligible employees do not participate in their
employer's 401(k) plan, automatic enrollment provisions can
potentially help those who are not preparing actively for
retirement." 10 3 However, it remains questionable whether this
increase will indeed take place. The real question is actually
whether or not there should be a mandatory system. Anyhow,
"[a]llowing employers to automatically enroll employees in defined
contribution plans reflects the trend away from socialized
retirement programs in favor of private wealth providing for the
bulk of retirement security. ' 104 Additionally, age discrimination
against older employees is prohibited.
2. EU
In the EU pension systems are-like in the US-mainly
employer-based. However the systems are not voluntary. This
results in higher coverage rates. The European main idea on
coverage can be explained as follows: the ability to maintain one's
living standard after retirement should be looked at in an
integrated way. In other words, coverage in Europe is linked to
the basic social security scheme.
This means that the state based pension schemes and private
occupational pension schemes are linked to one another. If the
income after retirement depends to a large extent on private
occupational pensions, then the access to funded private
occupational pensions should be increased. In this way, some
Member States plan to partly compensate for the decline in
statutory replacement rates by the development of privately
managed pension provision (in particular Germany, Italy,
Denmark and to a lesser extent Belgium).
The role of private occupational pensions differs immensely
between Member States.
These differences in roles become
101. Eriksson, supra note 78, at 148 ("Projections estimate that the
automatic enrollment feature will increase 401(k) participation by more than
twenty percent.").
102. See Sample Automatic Enrollment and Default Investment Notice,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/sample-notice.pdf (describing a
model of automatic enrollment).
103. Lineberry, supra note 80, at 18-19; US Dept. of Labor, Proposed
Regulation Relating To Default Investment Alternatives Under Participant
Directed
Individual
Retirement
Account
Plan,
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/ fsdefaultoptionproposalrevision.html. The
Department of Labor estimates automatic enrollment will increase aggregate
401(k) plan account balances by between $45 billion and $90 billion. Id.
104. Martin, supra note 35, at 861-62.
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apparent when analyzing the differences in coverage rates.
In Member States, where the private occupational pensions
are necessary to prevent poverty in old age, the affiliation is thus
obligatory.
Few Member States are familiar with such an
obligatory membership. Private schemes are only mandatory for
new entrants to the labor markets in Estonia, Latvia, Poland,
10 5
Hungary and Slovakia.
In Member States such as Denmark, Netherlands and
Lithuania, private occupational pensions also play an important
role, but the affiliation is not made obligatory by state law. For
most of these occupational pension schemes, membership or
affiliation is organized through the employer or representative
organs of employers and employees (on a sector-wide scale
usually).
For the affiliated employee, self-employed, or civil
servant, the affiliation is thus a consequence of the labor
agreement with the employer. Most of the time, the employee
cannot refuse the affiliation because the affiliation is obligatory.
For example, in Lithuania, access to the funded tier of statutory
scheme is voluntary, but once individuals are members they do not
have the option of opting out. For the employer, the organization
of the occupational plan can either be voluntary, whereby he
chooses to organise (or participate in the organisation of) an
occupational pension scheme or has, at least, the right to refuse
the participation in an occupational pension scheme. When an
employer cannot refuse to organise or participate in the scheme,
affiliation is mostly obligatory for all or a certain category of
employees (mixed affiliation systems).
In the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden, social partners
conclude collective agreements on occupational pension provision
at the level of sectors, and membership in these schemes is thus
mandatory. This obligation is not nation wide on the basis of a
national law. However the effect is nearly the same. Coverage
rates of such schemes are particularly high, up to 91 percent of
employees in the case of the Netherlands.
Other Member states have recently increased provisions for
making affiliation to occupational or private schemes more
06
attractive (Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Austria).
Also, in these Member States, the affiliation is based on the
employment relationship and thus obligatory for the employee if
the employer decided to give an occupational pension. In these
Member States, social partners are increasingly seeing pensions as
a central part of the employer employee contract and are
105. Techinical Annex, Adequate and Sustainable Pension, 20 (2006)
[hereinafter
Technical Annex],
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/
employment social/social-protectiondocs/2006/sec_2006_304_horizontalanalys
is-en.pdf.
106. Id.
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increasingly taking action in order to protect workers pension
rights.
Membership of pension provision can also be based on
voluntary decision, as employees may be free to decide whether to
contribute to an employment-related pension scheme or to save in
a personal retirement scheme unrelated to their employment
status. The clearest example is the United Kingdom. However, in
(State
Germany (Riester pension), the Czech Republic
Supplementary voluntary pension), and Spain, specific private
individual pensions are also developing. In the United Kingdom
pension schemes are voluntary for the employee, but employers
above a certain size (five or more employees) have to make pension
products available if they are currently not offering an appropriate
occupational pension scheme (the stakeholder pensions). A similar
arrangement is present in Ireland with the Personal retirement
savings accounts. In the UK, the State second pension provides a
compulsory earnings-related additional pension which is
particularly beneficial to people on low incomes or people with
interrupted careers. Opting out of this system is possible, but only
into a private or occupational scheme that has fulfilled certain
criteria that provide at least the benefits of the foregone state
In the UK, a significant number of the employed
scheme.
workforce is not covered by any supplementary pension schemes.
This issue has been addressed by the Turner Commission which
reported in late 2005. A key proposal of the report is the creation
of a new National Pensions Savings Scheme based on the defined
contribution design, mandatory for employers with automatic
10 7
enrolment for employees, but with an employee right to opt out.
Instruments for promoting private pension provision are
diverse and include collective bargaining (i.e. Belgium, the
Netherlands), tax incentives (i.e. UK and Ireland) and direct
financial support in the form of subsidies (i.e. Germany and the
Czech Republic).
For the EU, it is clear that tax incentives alone generally do
Several Member
not translate into comprehensive coverage.
States rely on the collective bargaining or mandatory membership
to achieve better coverage rates. 0 8
The following table gives an overview of the coverage rate of
occupational pensions in Europe. The differences can be explained
by the different role and the linked importance of private
occupational pension schemes in the different Member States. 10 9
107. Pensions Commission, Implementing a National Pension Savings
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
at
available
(2005),
368-69
Scheme,
shared/bsplhilpdfs/30 11_05chapterl0.pdf.
108. Technical Annex, supra note 105, at 20.
109. Id. at 21 (noting that figures for coverage from different types of
schemes do not necessarily add up because there can be double counting).
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European Member StatesO
BE

About 40-45 percent for occupational pensions and for
individual provisions.

CZ

Around 40 percent for individual provision.

DK

Around 95 percent.

DE

About 60 percent of people covered by the first pillar
scheme are also covered by occupational schemes and
about 13 percent make individual provision according
to the Riester legislation. 1 '

EE

Around 75 percent of the employed population for the
mandatory funded scheme and 8 percent for individual
provision.

EL

Nearly no coverage for occupational schemes.

ES

Around 44 percent of the employed for the second or
third pillar were estimated in 2004 (10 percent for
12
occupational provisions).
Around 10 percent for occupational provision and
around 8 percent have subscribed a life insurance plans

110. Country abbreviations: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; BG: Bulgaria; CY:
Cyprus; CZ: Czech: Republic; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; ES:
Spain; FI: Finland; FR: France; GR: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IS:
Iceland; IT: Italy; LI: Liechtenstein; LT: Lithuania; LU: Luxembourg; LV:
Latvia; MT: Malta; NL: Netherlands; NO: Norway; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal;
RO: Romania; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; UK: United: Kingdom.
111. Germany has a long-standing tradition of supplementary occupational
pension schemes dating back to the 19th century. Today, pension schemes in
Germany cover the entire spectrum of possible benefits and financing
methods. Approximately 10.4 million private sector employees, corresponding
to about 46 percent of the total private industry work force, are entitled to
company pensions. Well over 12 million private sector employees in Germany
are not covered by any supplementary pension schemes. HEWITT ASSOCIATES,
supra note 45, at 94.
112. Id. at 8. According to the latest information supplied by the National
Statistic Institute in 2005 the number of employees affiliated with Social
Security was 17,835,400. The most recent information for 2006 published by
the Insurance Authorities indicates that 1,814,362 employees had subscribed
to a pension scheme (company or professional) and 5,464,276 employees were
associated with an insurance contract. These statistics include double
counting because employees can participate in more than one scheme.
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specifically for retirement purposes.

IE

IT

About 52 percent of the workforce,
occupational and individual schemes.

including

Around 8 percent of the employed population for
occupational schemes and 2 percent for individual
provision.
Around 27 percent of the population in employment for
provident funds in the private sector and 13 percent or
occupational pensions in the public sector.
Around 45 percent of the employed population for the
mandatory funded defined contribution scheme and
around 3°/0 for individual provisions.

LT

Around 54 percent of the employed population for the
statutory funded pension schemes and around 8 percent
for individual schemes.

LU

Around 20 percent of the employed population for
occupational schemes and 5 percent for individual
provision.

HU

About 60 percent of the employed population are
members of the funded tier of the first pillar and about
31 percent have a voluntary pension plans.

MT

Negligible for occupational schemes (SPPS),
available for other private schemes (TPPS).
Around 90 percent
pension schemes.

not

of employees for occupational

Around 35 percent for occupational provision and
around 10 percent for individual provision.
Around 49 percent of the workforce for mandatory and
occupational provision.
Around 4 percent of the employed population for
occupational schemes and 1.5 percent for individual
provision
Around 51 percent of the workforce is covered by
occupational schemes.
SK
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About 27 percent of the population in employment are
covered by SPF schemes.
Around 5 percent of the population aged 15-64 for
occupational schemes and 12 percent for individual
provision.
SE

UK

About 90 percent of the workforce for occupational
schemes and 40 percent for individual schemes
Around 50 percent of the employed population
currently contribute to supplementary pension schemes
(about 45 percent contribute to occupational and about
14 percent to personal pensions)

The anti-discrimination rules in the EU have a main focus:
gender. Over the years, much work was done in the field of gender
equality and occupational pensions.
Pensions paid in the context of occupational social security
are considered as payment and must respect the principle of equal
pay for women and men. This includes all forms of private
occupational pensions. The European Court of Justice had decided
so in a constant stream of jurisprudence.113 The consequences of
this jurisprudence has led to three directives on the matter
(86/378, 96/97 and 2004/113). The main conclusions of both this
jurisprudence and legislation on gender equality in occupational
pensions 114 are:
*the use of actuarial factors which differ according to sex are
allowed. This means that where the employer makes the
commitment to pay a defined benefit this benefit has to be
the same for men and women. So, the employer may have
to pay higher contributions for women in order to bring
about the same benefit. In a defined-contribution scheme,
by contrast, the individual pension benefit is determined
according to the amount of the accumulated savings. Due
to the use of sex-based actuarial factors for calculating the
monthly pension provision, this may result in lower
benefits for women.
In this case the employer's
commitment, which has to be equal for men and women, is
113. Evelyn Ellis, The Supremacy of Community Pensions Equality Law: A
Two-Edged Sword?" 25 E.L.REv. 564 (2000); Bilka-Kaufus GmbH and K.
Weber von Hartz, Conclusie Van Adovocaat-Generaal M. Darmon, JUR.
H.V.J. 1607 (1986); Dominique De Vos, Les pensions professionnelles ou l'art de
linterrogation,SOC. KRON. 358 (1990)); Douglas Harvey Barber and Guardian
Royal Exchange, Assurance Group, Conclusie van Advocaat-Generaal W Van
Gereven, JUR. H.v.J. 1889, (1990).
114. Adequate and Sustainable Pensions Synthesis Report, supra note 44; see
also Technical Annex, supra note 105, at 89-90.

1224

The John Marshall Law Review

[41:1189

his contribution to the scheme.
*For private annuities, the use of sex-based actuarial factors in
insurance and related financial services is banned in
principle, but Member States may decide not to apply the
ban in cases where "sex is a determining factor in the
assessment of risk based on relevant and accurate actuarial
and statistical data."
*Several Member States introduced unisex-tariffs in second
pillar provisions, or like in Sweden and the Slovak Republic
(AND ALSO Poland is planning to do so), in the mandatory
funded part of the first pillar provisions, in order not to
worsen the pension situation of women due to a shift to
funded pension provisions.
oSex-related life tables single out one factor among many which
may determine life expectancy of an individual person.
Other important factors are, for example genetics, social
environment, working - and living conditions and
healthcare during one's lifetime. To quantify only one
criteria out of this portfolio tends to discriminate against
women purely on a basis of quantifiable ease. For that
reason the following Member States prevent the use of
gender life-tables in order to calculate pension entitlements
in occupational pension schemes: the Netherlands,
Denmark, Ireland, Sweden, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovak
Republic, Greece, and Luxemburg. In Germany, using
unisex-life-tables can be agreed between the social partners
only on a voluntary basis. However, for state supported
private saving "Riester-contracts" unisex-tariffs are
mandatory since beginning 2006. Luxemburg and Slovenia
have also put in place legislation in order to prevent private
insurance companies using gender life-tables in private
11 5
pension contracts.
Other prohibited discrimination grounds are the exclusion of
part-time workers (due to the indirect discrimination of women)
and the exclusion of workers with fixed employment contracts.
The difference with the US is enormous. In the US employers are
able to effectively exclude part-time employees by virtue of their
ability to exclude from plan participation employees who do not
work one thousand hours in a year and many have, in fact,
increased the number of part-time employees, reducing their
benefit costs. 116 In the EU such exclusion is clearly forbidden on
the basis of gender discrimination.
Other exclusion criteria are linked to the coverage rate in
each specific Member State.
In Member States where the

115. Technical Annex, supra note 105, at 89-90.
116. Id. at 323.
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affiliation is mandatory or obligatory, all discrimination is
(obviously) excluded. In Member States where the affiliation is
based on the employment relationship or collective bargaining the
national labour law applies. This means that-depending on the
situation-labor law allows differences in coverage. This could
mean for example that affiliation can be based on the height of the
remuneration, the social law category (blue collar, white collar...
the age of the employee, the health of the employee, etc. All these
categories can be forbidden in one Member State and allowed in
another. However if there is an indirect discrimination on gender
the EU law forbids the specific discrimination ground.
C. Benefit Design and Risk Transfer
In both in Europe and the US, the era of the defined benefit
plan is over. Some changes in benefit design are common between
the EU and the US. The impact of these changes remain however
significant.
1. Us
In the US-like elsewhere in the world-there are two basic
types of plans, defined benefit and defined contribution plans. All
plans must meet standards established by ERISA to receive a taxqualified status and must apply to the Internal Revenue Service if
they want a determination of that status.1 1 7 Some of the ERISA
standards for tax qualification include minimum coverage,
participation and vesting requirements. Originally, plans could
not include a disproportionate amount of highly compensated
employees over non-highly compensated employees or pay
disproportionately
greater benefits to the former (non
discrimination rules). All plans must be operated in a fiduciary
sound manner and be adequately funded. All plans may or may
not be integrated with the social security scheme.
In a traditional defined benefit plan, the employer promises to
pay specified pension benefits to each covered employee upon
retirement.
The pension formula is typically based on the
employee's years of service and final or average compensation.
The employer sponsors the plan, funds it with contributions,
directs the investment of plan assets, and bears the financial risk
if those assets prove insufficient to pay promised benefits. A great
variety of defined benefit plans with different benefit formulas
exist. Benefits may be earnings-related or flat rate. Formulas
may be based on average career salary or final salary etc. Cash
balance plans are defined benefit plans under which the employer
117. U.S. Department of Labor, Frequently Asked Questions about Pension
Plans
and
ERISA,
available
at
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa
/faqs/faq_compliancepension.html.
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records notional contributions into hypothetical individual
accounts and periodically adds interest at a predefined rate.
These plans have developed as an alternative to traditional plans.
All DC plans promise an employee only the value of her
account balance at retirement.
While that means unlimited
upside potential for employees, it also means no floor below which
benefits cannot fall. In contrast, DB plans enjoy the benefit of
insurance which assures that no matter what financial difficulties
a plan suffers, participants will receive at least some level of
pension security.
ERISA does not extend that insurance
118
protection to DC plans.
Defined contribution plans feature individual accounts for
members. The benefits are based on employer and employee
contributions along with income, gains, losses and forfeitures
(from other employees' accounts). The plan member bears the risk
under this type of plan.
There are many types of defined
contribution plans and the most important ones are:
Profit-sharing plan: A plan established and maintained by an
employer to provide for the participation by employees in the
sponsoring employer's profits.
An Employee stock ownership plan (ESOP): A plan that provides
shares of stock in the sponsoring employer to plan members. An
ESOP invests at least 51 percent of its assets in the sponsoring
employer stock and is permitted to borrow money on a taxdeductible basis to purchase this stock.
A Stock bonus plan: A plan under which contributions are made in
the form of company stock derived from a portion of the company's
profits. Benefits are also paid in the form of company stock.119
Apart from the type of DC plans, there are also special
"features" on DC plans. The best known is 401(k). A defined
contribution plan can be a 401(k) plan.
This means that
employees are allowed to make before-tax contributions from their
salaries. This feature may be incorporated into most types of
defined contribution plans. These 401(k) plans have become the
dominant form of defined contribution plans. 120 401(k) plans give
individual employees unprecedented control over decisions
concerning
participation,
contributions,
investments,
and
withdrawals of funds in their own accounts. Thus, 401(k) plans
represent a major shift of risk and responsibility from employers
121
to employees.
Another feature of DC plans is "IRA".
IRA stands for
Individual Retirement Arrangements.
IRAs are Tax-favored
118.
119.
120.
121.

Stabile, supra note 86, at 312-13.
U.S. Department of Labor, supranote 117.
Burke, supranote 89, at 299-300.
Id. at 305.
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defined contribution arrangements which may be established by
individuals in the form of either an individual retirement account
or an individual retirement annuity. There are several types of
Individual Retirement Arrangements (IRAs) including traditional,
Roth, SIMPLE, 122 and SEP123 IRAs. The latter two types are
employer-sponsored plans that are implemented through IRAs.
When ERISA was enacted in 1974, its regulatory provisions
focused primarily on DB plans, which at that time predominated
over DC plans.1 24 The situation has changed dramatically in the
intervening years, as DC plans have grown steadily and DB plans
have dwindled in relative importance. 125 Literature mentions a
126
combination of structural reasons linked to these changes.
These reasons mainly come down to a heightened liability and
increased costs which outweigh tax incentives. Thus employers
prefer DC because of the uniform investment growth, 127 the
122. An employer with less than 100 employees may establish a SIMPLE
through a contract with an IRA provider to which employees earning at least
USD 5,000 can contribute a portion of their before-tax salaries. The maximum
employee contribution is USD 10,000 (USD 12,000 for employees age 50 or
older). Employers either match the employee contribution by as much as 3
percent of salary or make a straight contribution of as much as 2 percent of
salary. Both employee and employer contributions vest immediately. Savings
Incentive Match Plan for Employees of Small Employers (SIMPLE IRA Plan)
under § 408(p) of the Internal Revenue Code, available at http://www.irs.gov!
pub/ irs-utl/simpleplanirm.pdf.
123. See SEP Retirement Plans for Small Businesses, available at
http://www.dol.gov/ ebsa/publications/SEPPlans.html (providing that a plan
for small employers in which they establish SEP-IRAs through a contract with
an IRA provider for themselves and their employees.
The maximum
contribution limits are 25 percent of salary or USD 42,000, whichever is less,
and contributions vest immediately).
124. Burke, supra note 89, at 299-300.
125. See Stabile, supra note 86, at 307-09 (providing a detailed analysis
including recent figures on the shift from DB to DC).
126. See Samuel Estreicher and Laurence Gold, The Shift From Defined
Benefit Plans to Defined Contribution Plans, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 331,
332 (2007); Eriksson, supra note 78, at 152-53; see also Burke, supra note 89,
at 302 (including structural proposals such as:
intense competition from low-wage labor overseas;
employers downsizing workforces
and demanding significant
concessions from the remaining employees;
a decline in average job tenure;
an erosion of labor union membership and bargaining power;
the emergence of health care as the most important employer-provided
fringe benefit;
a widening gap in compensation between highly compensated and rankand-file employees;
an increasing heavy burden of government regulation;
stringent funding requirements;
the investment risks for the employers; and
the longer life expectancies of retired employees).
127. Martin, supra note 35, at 846. Furthermore, defined contribution plans
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relative simplicity, and transparency. 128 Whatever these reasons,
the traditional idea of creating defined benefit plans leading to a
129
stable workforce with secure job tenure is outdated.
Defined contribution plans, particularly those of the 401(k)
type, have decisively overtaken traditional defined benefit plans as
the predominant form of private pension plan. 130 The 401(k)
model is thought to be attractive for both employers and
employees.
For employers, 401(k)s are less burdensome than defined
benefit plans, both financially and administratively. In a 401(k),
retirement benefits are based on the balance in each employee's
individual account, which in turn depends on the employee's net
contributions and investment performance; the employer is not
13
responsible for providing any specified level of pension benefits. '
Furthermore, a standard 401(k) plan serves the enterprise's
interests by providing its participants-particularly those earning
allow for more uniform investment growth because salary and longevity do not
dictate contributions; rather, contributions are based on whatever portion of
the participant's salary the participant wants to contribute (up to the
statutorily allowed maximum) coupled with the employer's matching
contribution (provided to all participants). Id.
128. See Estreicher, supra note 126, at 333 (noting that from the sponsor's
viewpoint, DC plans are preferred because they are relatively simple and
inexpensive to establish and administer). Further, DC plans are partially
financed by participant contributions. Sponsors can fund their contributions
year by year on a tax-advantaged basis, without being exposed to any of the
financial risks associated with providing a defined retirement benefit, or to
any appreciable regulatory risk. Id.
129. Martin, supra note 35, at 846. According to Martin and Rafsky, the
defined benefit plan is the representative model of the "American Dream" for
some people.
The model represents an American workplace based on
manufacturing and exporting and a workforce that remained loyal to its
employers. Historically, employees did not conceive of working for several
different companies throughout their careers. In other words, employees
worked hard and devoted the bulk of their careers to one employer that
provided a defined benefit plan and, in turn, received hefty pensions to cover
retirement expenses. Id.
130. Burke, supranote 89, at 299-301; Martin, supra note 35, at 863. Not all
shifts are towards 401(k) plans. Other shifts are towards cash balance plans.
The PPA 2006 legitimizes cash balance and hybrid pension plans. Before PPA
2006, the question arose whether there was no age discrimination. The PPA
2006 clarifies that a defined benefit plan is not considered age discriminatory
"if a participant's accrued benefit, as determined as of any date under the
terms of the plan, would be equal to or greater than that of any similarly
situated, younger individual who is or could be a participant." Pension
Protection Act § 701. A cash balance plan does not violate the prohibition
against ceasing or reducing the rate of an employee's benefit accrual because
of age as long as a participant's accrued benefit meets the similarly situated
standard described above. Consequently, there is no discriminatory violation
being committed as long as similarly situated employees receive equal annual
credits to their accounts.
131. Burke, supra note 89, at 306.

2008]

European and American Issues in Employee Benefits Law

1229

higher compensation and enjoying greater job mobility-a
personal, tangible, and portable means of providing for
retirement.132
For employees, the attraction of 401(k)s is thought to be that
participation is voluntary. Each employee can choose either to
contribute to his or her account (subject to deferred tax on
withdrawal) or to receive compensation in cash (subject to
immediate tax). Moreover, the entire account balance is fully
vested and freely portable. Changing jobs has no impact on
account balances or future benefits. In addition, 401(k)s are
believed to foster a sense of ownership which many employees find
reassuring. 133 No matter what the said advantages are believed to
be, there are also clear disadvantages to the voluntary affiliation
(a Matthew effect and an insecure social security).
The shift away from defined benefit plans has major
implications for the allocation of risks and opportunities in the
private pension system.1 34 Although the nature of this shift is
clear, its implications for retirement policy remain controversial.
While employers usually contribute to each defined contribution
account at specified rates, employers do not guarantee accounts.
Risk of decline in account assets is therefore borne by each
individual employee based on the investment choices he or she
makes. 135 Hence some worry that employees, especially those at
the lower end of the wage scale, are likely to make poor decisions
and be left with inadequate retirement income. In contrast, others
believe that employees are in the best position to make choices
concerning saving and investing for their own retirement.
Moreover, some welcome 401(k) plans as an evolutionary step on
the road to unlimited tax-favored saving. 136
When the PPA 2006 was enacted, Congress was aware of the
problems related to the shift from DB to DC.137 However, not
everybody is convinced that the PPA 2006 does what it should do.
Eriksson writes: "The implicit defects of the Pension Act
counteract its proclaimed goals. Instead of rescuing definedbenefit pension plans, the Pension Act eradicates them." 138 One

132. Estreicher, supra note 126, at 333.
133. Burke, supra note 89, at 306. In 401(k) plans employees receive
periodic statements showing their account balances; plans typically allow
employees to withdraw the entire balance in a lump sum upon retirement or
termination of employment; and any balance remaining in an employee's
account at death passes to his or her designated beneficiaries.
134. Id. at 299-300.
135. Martin, supranote 35, at 846.
136. Burke, supra note 89, at 305.
137. See, e.g., Eriksson, supra note 78, at 133-57 (explaining that The PPA
2006 has given rise to a lot of controversy within the US and that there are
many articles on the topic that are quite pessimistic.).
138. Id. at 152-53.
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can indeed not deny that PPA 2006 promotes defined-contribution
plans. While employers are consistently eliminating definedbenefit plans, other employers are taking advantage of the
automatic enrollment feature of defined-contribution plans to
increase employee participation.
Features like automatic
enrollment and lifecycle funds tend to increase actual employee
participation, but also fail to address lingering issues of
individuals failing to provide sufficient funding to their accounts
139
and fail to utilize sound investing strategies.
Nevertheless, some parts of the PPA 2006 are meant to react
to the shift from DB to DC.140 The most important element is the
fact that the PPA 2006 installs a New Defined Benefit 401(K)
Plan. Beginning with the 2010 plan year, employers with at least
two and no more than 500 employees will be able to create a new
hybrid defined benefit/401(k) plan. The plan is exempt from
nondiscrimination and top-heavy testing. This should lure the
employers. The new hybrid DB/401(k) plan should be particularly
attractive to small professional corporations and partnerships,
where owners want to defer more income for retirement than is
possible under defined contribution rules and are willing to give
their employees' pension benefits.
The DB/401(k) plan will
combine a final average pay defined benefit plan with a safe
harbor-type 401(k) plan. 141 In addition, the plan uses one plan
document and trust fund, and will be treated as a single plan for
reporting
purposes.

139. Id.
140. See generally Daniel Klaff, The Pension ProtectionAct 2006: Reforming
the Defined Benefit Pension System, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 553, 553-68 (2007)
(offering a detailed analysis on the changes the PPA 2006 brought for Defined
Benefit Schemes).
141. The 401(k) feature will require automatic enrollment with an employee
deferral of four percent of compensation and an employer matching
contribution of fifty percent of an employee's contributions up to four percent

of compensation. The rate of matching contributions for highly compensated
employees cannot exceed the matching contribution rate for non-highly
compensated employees. The defined benefit plan must provide a benefit
equal to one percent of final average pay times years of service, to a maximum
of twenty percent of final average pay. If a cash balance plan is used instead
of a final average pay plan, then the PPA 2006 requires the following pay
credits: at least two percent of compensation for participants age thirty and
under, four percent of compensation for participants who have reached age
thirty but not age forty, six percent of compensation for participants who have
reached age forty but not age fifty, and eight percent of compensation for
participants who have reached at least age fifty. The Penstion ProtectionAct
of 2006. New Rules for Retirement Plans: New Plan Design Options, New Plan
Requirements, New Fiduciary Protection (November 2006), available at
http://www.haygroup.com.
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The increasing trend to use DC plans, like 401(k) plans, and
IRAs for retirement savings leaves an increasing number of
participants responsible for making their own decisions with
respect to retirements funds.1 42 This is clearly controversial in the
US. The following extracts make this very clear:
[iun sum, a pension plan design that shifts the decision-making
responsibility on plan financial matters - participation, the level of
funding, and the handling of the accumulating corpus of assets from the sponsor (who is in a superior financial decision-making
position) to the participants (who are highly unlikely to have the
knowledge and expertise necessary to make these financial decisions
and are if anything even more unlikely to have the time or the
capacity to enable them to acquire, and to then continuously apply,
the necessary financial knowledge and expertise) is severely
flawed. 143
Instead of a small cadre of experts making investment decisions, the
switch to 401(k) put millions of investment novices in charge of their
own future. Folks who don't know asset allocation from Alsatian
hunting dogs are expected to choose a proper mix of age- and riskappropriate investments. Many, if not most, employees lack the
knowledge to make the necessary financial decisions. The result
appears to be that participants in general follow simple investment
strategies and end up with either too much or too little stock in their
portfolios. Worse, having made an investment decision, most
44
employees fail to ever change their plan investment allocations.1
Whether through inexperience, bad advice, or poor judgment, 401(k)
participants often make objectively bad investment decisions: most
participants fail to diversify or rebalance their portfolios, more than
half either hold no stocks at all or invest virtually their entire
accounts in stocks, and many invest a substantial portion of their
accounts in employer stock when they are allowed to do so. Finally,
in deciding when and how to withdraw funds from their accounts,
most participants take a lump sum distribution upon termination or
retirement. Although large lump sums received at retirement are
amounts are likely to be
likely to be rolled over into IRAs, smaller
45
spent rather than saved for retirement. 1
The debate in the US is ideologically important. The debate
can be described as a fight between the right to "own" or the right
to "social justice". One can argue that the success of 401(k) plans
lies in the opening of opportunities for individual employees to
make their own decisions about saving and investment. However
one can also argue that the rewards of 401(k)s are heavily skewed

142. Lineberry, supra note 80, at 16.
143. Estreicher, supra note 126, at 334.
144. See Stabile, supra note 86, at 313.

145. Burke, supra note 89, at 307-08.
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toward highly paid employees, who can accumulate savings even
without a tax subsidy. Proof of this is that less than 10 percent of
participants contribute the maximum allowable amount. 146 The
PPA 2006 has not significantly changed this debate. The basic
element of the discussion is not answered. The need for social
protection for the employees in DC plans is unanswered. Yet,
several options arise. For example, one could make compulsory
plans or install insured guarantees. The PPA 2006 does not
answer this basic question.
The PPA 2006 has responded limitedly when it comes to the
ideological debate with regard to the shifting of the investment
risk.
Two (rather limited) aspects can be mentioned: the
investment advice and the diversification right.
Initially, ERISA prohibited 401(k) plans from offering
investment advice to plan participants. In the past, pension
managers handled investment selection and allocation for
employees. 147 Under a statutory safe harbor for self-directed
accounts, employers are thus relieved of fiduciary liability for
losses and breaches resulting from the exercise of control by
employees. Nevertheless, employers always retained (and still do)
residuary responsibility for maintaining a "broad range" of
available investment options and ensuring that employees have
access to sufficient information to allow them to make informed
decisions. Relieving employers of fiduciary responsibility for selfdirected accounts, however, has had the perverse effect of
discouraging employers from providing specific investment advice
that many employees desire. Indeed, self-directed plans offer an
ever-expanding array of options, far beyond the minimum range
required by the safe harbor. 148 The PPA 2006 now allows ERISAcovered plans to offer participants investment advice through an
"eligible investment advice arrangement." The arrangement must
be authorized by disinterested plan fiduciaries that are not
affiliated with the advisor providing investment advice. 149 The
advisors must disclose compensation, potential conflicts, plan
investment option past performance, available services, fiduciary
relationship(s), use of participant information, and inform
participants they can obtain advice from an advisor not affiliated
with the plan. Participants now will have access to investment
1 50
advice but ultimately still make their own investment decisions.

146. Id.
147. Lineberry, supra note 80, at 16.
148. Burke, supra note 89, at 306.
149. Investment advice must be provided through either: (1) a fiduciary
advisor whose fees do not vary based on the investment option selected, or (2)
a computer model that meets the Act's requirements as well as independent
third-party certifications. Pension Protection Act § 601.
150. See Joel Daniel, Chip Hunt and Chip Hardy, Employers and 401(k)
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The PPA 2006 now grants diversification rights to participants in
DC plans. These rights will allow eligible participants to divest and
reinvest those plan portions attributable to employee contributions
and elective deferrals invested in publicly traded employer
securities. This diversification should minimize the risks associated
with holding too few and too risky investments. Consequently, the
PPA 2006 requires plans that must allow diversification to offer at
least three investment alternatives other than employer securities.
Diversified alternatives with materially different risk and return
In order to prevent employer
characteristics are required.
discouragement of diversification, employers cannot impose
restrictions or conditions on investment of employer securities that
of the plan, except
they do not impose on investments of other assets
1 51
as provided by application of securities laws.
2.

EU

Compared to the EU, the US has at least one advantage when
it comes to benefit design, namely, the US has federal uniform
For Americans, it might therefore be quite
legal definitions.
incredible to note that what is meant by the terms DB and DC can
15 2
vary greatly from State to State.
At the European level, only CEIOPS uses uniform
definitions.15 3
For CEIOPS, a DC scheme is defined as an
occupational pension system scheme where the only obligation of
the scheme sponsor is to pay a specified contribution to the scheme
on behalf of the employee. No further promises or 'guarantees' are
made. As for the DB scheme, it is an occupational pension scheme
other than a defined contribution scheme.
Although these European-wide CEIOPS definitions exist,
they have no true legal impact. Furthermore, CETOPS admits
that even with their rather uncomplicated definitions there are DB

Service Providers: The Looming Battles Over Hidden Fees and Costs, 18 S. C.
LAw. 20, 20 (2007) (illustrating a more detailed discussion of the motivations
for change to, and impact upon, the provisions relating to 401(k) plans);
Lineberry, supra note 80, at 16. Advisors cannot decide investment amounts
or direct where the employee should invest funds. Further, the PPA 2006
requires the plan to undergo annual independent audits of the investment
advice process.
151. Martin, supra note 35, at 860-61.
152. Survey on Fully Funded, Technical Provisionsand Security Mechanisms
in the European Occupational Pension Sector, at 11, COM (2008) Final (Mar.
available
at
http://www.ceiops.eu/media/docman/
31,
2008),
publicjfiles/publications/ submissionstotheec/ ReportonFundSecMech.pdf.
153. CEIOPS is the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors. It was established under the terms of the European
Commission Decision 2004/6/EC of November 4, 2003 and is composed of high
level representatives from the insurance and occupational pensions
The
supervisory authorities of the European Union's Member States.
authorities of the Member States of the European Economic Area also
participate in CEIOPS. CEIOPS, http://www.ceiops.eu.
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schemes in some Member States which are so hybrid that they can
be considered DC under national legislation and vice versa. This
hybridism is mainly reflected in some national occupational
pension systems allowing book reserves (internal funding), which
operate in AT, DE, ES, LU and SE.154
The lack of true uniform legal definitions clearly complicates
legal research. As stated earlier, Europe is in a state of desperate
disparity. Further, for six Member States (BG, LV, PL, RO, SI
and SK) there is no discussion because they are only familiar with
DC. 155 In Italy, DB schemes play a marginal role, as they are
closed to new members and all new funds are DC. Conversely, all
German schemes are considered DB from a legal and statutory
point of view (although some are clearly DC under the CEIOPS
definition).
According to a recent survey held within large
companies in nine Member States forty-nine percent of schemes
are DB; thirty-four percent are DC; and seventeen percent are
hybrid. 156 Additionally, the nine Member States do not include
157
those Member States where there is no DB (except Poland).
Nonetheless, the desperate disparity, the scarce national
research on occupational pensions in the EU clearly indicates that
there is a shift from DB to DC. However, there are no exact
figures. The impact of these shifts is much less felt in Europe than
in the US Due to the basic social security benefits which remain
relatively high, the impact of these shifts much less felt in Europe
than in US The social security benefits remain-compared to the
US-relatively high. Anyhow, some Member States have installed
-as a reaction to the shift from DB to DC-some form of
minimum guarantee for some DC plans. The most common
examples are in Germany and Belgium.
IRA's as existing in the US, also exist in Europe. The UK,
Ireland and some new Eastern Member States of the Union legally
acknowledge these forms. Otherwise, these so called self-directed
investment accounts are rarely considered occupational pensions
in Europe.
This has to do with two reasons. The first is taxation. IRA's
are often seen as a form of individual saving that is fiscally
subsidized. This subsidy is often considered socially unjust
because the richer can profit more from it than the poor (the socalled Matthew effect). The second reason is social policy in
general. For most Europeans, DC schemes transfer the risk of not
achieving an adequate retirement income to the household level.
This quasi individual level is too dangerous from a societal
European point of view. The self-directed investment accounts
154.
155.
156.
157.

See supranote 110 and accompanying text.
HEWITT ASSOCIATES, supra note 45, at 8.
Id.
Id.
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transfer two risks to a near individual level: the market
investment risk and the longevity risk. For most European
experts, these risks should be covered at a higher level than at the
individual. The ideological debate of the US is thus, less present
in the EU. Nevertheless, it is present.
The debate on risks in the EU is more focused on the
longevity risk than on the investment risk. This is because of a
double given. First, many occupational pensions can be paid in a
lump sum. Hence, the longevity risk is shifted to the individual.
Different Member States have adopted various solutions to these
problems by, for example, installing an obligatory index that is
linked to the general welfare level. 158
It is believed the
participants should not exclusively bear the mortality risk of
outliving an installment stream of benefit payments.
Secondly, there are very few plans in Europe whereby the
individual employee can choose how to invest. The investment
decisions usually do not lie with the individual or the employer.
Commonly, the plan administrator decides on the investment
strategy (the insurance company, the pension fund, the bank, the
provident fund, the mutual fund or any other retirement provider).
D. Portability
Portability is defined as the possibility of acquiring and
keeping pension entitlements in the event of professional
mobility. 15 9 This issue is regulated in the US by a federal law. In
Europe, the very first steps are being taken to develop a common
portability framework.
1. Us
Upon termination of employment before retirement, plan
members may, if the plan provides for this option, withdraw the
cash value of their accrued benefits or their own accumulated and
vested employer contributions as a lump sum.
Defined
contribution plans usually provide for this option whereas it is
rare under defined benefit plans. 160 In addition to income tax, an
excise tax generally applies to such lump-sum withdrawals made
before the age of fifty nine and six months.
In the case of defined benefit plans, accrued benefits are
usually preserved in the plan. There are no legal requirements
concerning the adjustment of preserved benefits. In the case of
158. Survey on Fully Funded, Technical Provisions and Security Mechanisms
in the European OccupationalPension Sector, supra note 153, at 13.
159. See generally Adequate and Sustainable Pensions Synthesis Report,
supra note 44, at 138 (indicating that transferability refers to one specific way
of achieving portability, namely by transferring a capital representing the
acquired pension entitlements from one scheme to another).
160. U.S. Department of Labor, supra note 117.
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defined contribution plans, it is, depending on the type of plan,
possible to transfer the accumulated capital to another plan. For
401(k) plans, the entire account balance is fully vested and freely
portable. Thus changing jobs has no impact on account balances
or future benefits. Employees cannot continue contributing to a
plan after terminating employment with the sponsoring employer.
In 2001, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001 ("EGTRRA") increased transferability by expanding
the types of plans that can take transfers and made it easier to
transfer rights from one type of plan to another (e.g. between
public-sector and private-sector plans). 161 In addition, the law
provides for easier transfer of benefits that a surviving spouse
receives as a beneficiary to plans that the spouse participates in.

3. EU
Portability of pension rights is a hot and heavily debated
issue in Europe. This has to do with one of the basic values of the
EU: free movement of workers within the Union. This free
movement means that there should be no impediments in
transferring pension rights from one Member State to another
Member State. However, the decision to change jobs depends on a
variety of factors including the impact on future pension
entitlement, because often a significant share of an individual's
remuneration is in the form of pension rights. In the European
context, the transfer of these rights includes:
*the conditions of acquisition of pension rights;
*the conditions of preservation of dormant pension rights;
*the transferability of acquired rights (the actual funds);
*the information given to workers on how mobility may affect;
supplementary pension rights.
Directive 98/49/EC of 29 June 1998 relates to safeguarding
the supplementary pension rights of employed and self-employed
persons moving within the Community. This Directive ensures
equal treatment of migrant workers and national job changers
regarding their occupational pension rights. Additionally, the
Directive only applies in a very limited number of cases and it only
guarantees equal treatment with national residents. So, if the
national residents are not protected, there is no protection either
for the migrant worker.
A lot of Member States lack proper rules on the transferring
of the rights within their own Member State. All Member States
with high minimum ages for affiliation and long maximum vesting
161. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.) (2001).
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A small selection to

*In the United Kingdom, for instance, some personal and
occupational pension schemes (other than stakeholder
pensions) are able to refuse to accept the transfer of vested
rights into their system. The European survey states that
"In over half of UK-based schemes, transfer-in rights are
either
not
permitted
or
only
permitted
with
employer/trustee discretion."
*In over half of Spanish-based schemes, transfer-in rights are
either
not
permitted
or
only
permitted
with
employer/trustee discretion.
In the case of Defined
Contribution schemes, none of the organizations allow
transferring.
*Denmark indicated in their National Strategy Report that
while reduced transfer fees have improved the possibilities
for transfer, the bonus potential is not transferable between
pension providers, which make the consequences of a
transfer less transparent.
*Cyprus reported that transferability of pension rights amongst
Provident Funds is not possible and for most funds full
vesting of rights does not occur before seven or even ten
years membership.
*Finland pointed out that supplementary pensions are
considered as part of corporate personnel policies rather
than essential elements of pension provisions.
*Germany has improved portability by introducing a right for
employees (under certain conditions) to take occupational
pension entitlements with them to their new employer.
This right applies to new agreements concluded since
January 1, 2005 and implemented through direct
insurance, 'Pensionskasse' or pension fund.
*In Poland the transfer of pension rights (after termination of
job contract) in and out are permitted only between the
same type of plan -from
qualified plan into another
qualified plan or IRA (individual retirement account). In
Poland there is no possibility to transfer rights and assets
from non-qualified into qualified plans and from qualified
into non-qualified plans.
In all defined benefits schemes in France, rights cannot be
transferred in or out since benefits are not usually vested
and are only available at retirement. Rights under defined
contributions schemes or collective retirement saving plans
162
can be transferred in or out.

162. Adequate and SustainablePensions Synthesis Report, supra note 44, at
138-39; HEWITT ASSOCIATES, supra note 45, at 8.
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Under the principle of subsidiarity, the EU is allowed to
interfere when the mobility of the national residents is hampered
by national legislation. Therefore, in order to improve the overall
conditions of portability and accompany the initiatives already
taken by some Member States, the European Commission has
recently adopted a proposal for a directive improving the
portability of private pension rights. This proposal aims to reduce
the main obstacles to portability (besides taxation) both within
Member States as across borders relating to acquisition conditions
(waiting, vesting periods, minimum ages), preservation of dormant
rights and transferability of acquired rights. 16 3 Initially, the
proposed directive foresaw:
*ceilings for acquisition conditions (i.e. affiliation requirements):
*a maximum permitted entry age 21
*a maximum permitted waiting period 1 year (or the period
until employee reaches age 21, if later)
*a maximum permitted vesting period 2 years
*the preservation of rights. The draft directive required member
states to ensure that deferred benefits 'are adjusted in
order not to penalize the mobile worker'. In an attempt to
avoid excessive administration costs for low-value dormant
rights, it allowed schemes to opt not to preserve these
rights but to transfer out, or pay a capital sum
representing, acquired rights which do not exceed a
threshold established by the member state concerned.
*the transferability of rights. Schemes had to allow leavers the
option of:
*deferred benefits (unless those rights were so small that this
would lead to excessive administrative costs); or
*a transfer. to another scheme within 18 months after
termination of employment (member states had the option
to exclude this requirement in the case of unfunded
occupational schemes).
othe disclosure of information. Workers had to be well informed
about leaving service rights. Any potential outgoing worker,
whether or not a member of the scheme, may request this
information, and the information must be provided within a
164
reasonable period of time.
However, no consensus could be reached until now on a lot of
these issues. Thus, the proposal was altered in such a way that it
is no longer upheld as a real portability directive.1 65 Currently, a
163. Adequate and Sustainable Pensions Synthesis Report, supra note 44, at
139.
164. Directive of the European Parliament,supra note 51.
165. The full title of the original directive was: Proposalfor a Directive of the
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new proposal (with less portability rights) is put before the
European Parliament. It remains unclear in the current state of
affairs what the effect will be. 166 For the time being, there can be
no doubt that there is no real portability of occupational pension
rights in the EU.
E. Information and Disclosure
Information plays a key role for the provision of private
pensions. There are two reasons, and both are reoccurring in the
EU and the US. First, information is necessary for the public
policy debate and the decision-making process. Information is the
governmental tool for monitoring the development of privatelymanaged schemes. This is an information requirement at a macro
level.
Secondly, people participating in private schemes are entitled
to a clear understanding of how the schemes are operated.
However, to provide understandable information on private
occupational pensions to employees seems to be a pervasive
problem in the world. The complexity of the schemes is probably
one of the reasons for the problem.
Another element in Europe and the US is finding the right
balance between the meaningful disclosure to participants and
beneficiaries on one hand, and the apprehension not to unduly
burden plan administrators on the other. This second reason is
the information requirement at a micro level.
1. Us
Traditionally, the US knew few legal requirements on
disclosure at a micro individual level. The requirements have
grown increasingly extensive over the years. Now, there is quite a
lot of legislation on the topic. All plans must be disclosed to
members in a written plan document. 167 Plan members must
receive a simplified form of the plan document known as summary
plan description ("SPD") and a summary of material modifications
when plan features are changed. 168 If the participant wants to see

European Parliament and the Council on the Improvement of Portability of
Supplementary Pension Rights. Id. Originally, the Commission had made an
ambitious proposal which would have enabled workers to enjoy true
portability of their pensions. Many people have expressed disappointment at
the removal of provisions to assist the transfer of pensions, but welcomed the
report's clear commitment to setting minimum standards for the access to
pension rights and fair treatment of dormant rights.
166. Amended Proposal for a Directive on Minimum Requirements for
Enhancing Worker Mobility by Improving the Acquisition and Preservationof
Supplementary Pension Rights, at 507, COM (2005).
167. U.S. Department of Labor, supra note 117.
168. Id.
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the plan document, the plan administrator must hand it over. 169
70
Annual plan reports must be made publicly available.1
The PPA 2006 act mandates certain automatic disclosure of
benefit statements, as well as more timely and expansive
disclosure, to ERISA participants and beneficiaries, effective
beginning in 2007.171 The changes apply to all forms of plans (both
DC and DB). The PPA 2006 requires that individual benefit
statements be distributed on (1) a quarterly basis for individual
account plans that permit participants to direct their own
investments, (2) at least annually for individual account plans that
do not permit participant-directed investments, and (3) at least
once every three years for defined benefit plans. 172 Section 102(b)
of ERISA now provides an extensive list of the information that
must be included in a SPD. McMorran perceives six different
disclosure elements:
*information that should assist a participant in locating the
plan sponsor and the fiduciaries who are charged with the
administration of the plan, as well as the agent for service
of process;
einstructions on how a participant may obtain copies of the plan
document and, if applicable, a related collective bargaining
agreement;
etechnical information concerning the type of the plan (pension
or welfare benefits), the nature of its administration (such
as third-party administration, insurance, self-insurance,
etc.) and the plan's funding arrangements;
*an explanation of the requirements for eligibility to participate
in the plan and eligibility to receive benefits under the
plan;
*a description of the benefits provided under the plan and any
limitations or exclusions that might be applicable to a claim
for benefits; and
*a statement notifying participants
173
obligations under ERISA.

of their rights

and

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Kathryn
Kennedy,
ERISA's
Participant Benefit
Statement
Requirements: Current Rules Under PPA '06 and a Suggested Blueprint for
Future Interpretations,TAX MGMT. COMP. PLAN. J. 319, 319 (2007). Although

the Department of Labor provided good faith reliance regarding these
requirements through a field assistance bulletin, that guidance left plan
sponsors and third party administrators with a number of unanswered
questions.
172. Allison McMorran Sulentic, Secrets, Lies & ERISA: The Social Ethics of
Misrepresentations and Omissions in Summary Plan Descriptions, 40 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 731, 737-40 (2007).
173. Id.
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Under the new law, a penalty is automatic for a plan
administrator who fails to comply with the requirements. As a
result, instead of being limited to those participants/beneficiaries
who requested but did not receive such disclosure, the new rules
would
impose
such
a
sanction
on
behalf
of all
participants/beneficiaries
who should have received such
disclosure, regardless of whether they made a request.174
Apparently the new requirements of the PPA 2006 will have a
significant impact on the administrative burdens and costs of
employee benefit plans, which unfortunately, in the defined
contribution plan model, may be passed along to the participants
75
and beneficiaries either directly or indirectly. 1
Another new element in the PPA 2006 that relates to
information is linked to the diversification right. In order to
encourage diversification, the PPA 2006 requires DC plans to
provide notice to participants regarding their diversification
rights. The notice must set forth the participants' rights to
diversify their accounts and describe "the importance of
diversifying the investment of retirement account assets."'176 The
notice must be "written in a manner calculated to be understood
by the average plan participant and may be delivered in a written,
electronic, or other appropriate form."'177 The notice requirements
are effective as of January 1, 2007.178
Furthermore, due to the PPA 2006, ERISA now requires a
significant amount of information to be filed with government
offices (primarily, the Department of Labor, although many plans
are also subject to additional filing requirements under the
Internal Revenue Code). This relates to the governmental wish to
monitor the retirement schemes (macro level).
2. EU
Information and disclosure are topics on which the EU has
already worked quite a lot. There is, compared to other topics,
quite a lot of common concern. For pension funds, there is even
European legislation (IORP directive 2003/41). Although there is
no such European regulation for insurance companies, similar
rules apply.
Most Member States already have disclosure
regulations applicable to all schemes and plans. The rules in the
IORP directive can therefore, be seen as minimum standards.
There are two sets of information stream. There is information to
be provided to members and beneficiaries (micro level), and there
are reporting requirements to the supervisory authorities (macro
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Kennedy, supra note 171, at 211.
Id.
Martin, supra note 35, at 860.
Id.
Id.
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level).
Under the Directive, members and beneficiaries have the
179
right to receive certain information with regard to the scheme.
The Directive distinguishes between information to be provided
automatically and information to be provided on request.
Details of changes to the rules on pension schemes are to be
provided automatically and within a reasonable time.
On request:
@annual reports and accounts,
*statement of investment policy principles,
edetails of the target level of retirement benefits,
*the level of benefits in the event of leaving employment,
edetails relating to transferring benefits,
*details of benefits payable and payment options when the
benefits become due,
*for money purchase schemes details of the investment options
and the actual investment portfolio, together with
information on risk exposure and costs.180
Following an amendment by the European Parliament,
members will need to annually receive brief particulars concerning
the situation of the institution and the current level of financing of
their accrued individual entitlements.
Most Member States
however go further and several Member States have already
pointed out that expanded information obligations to private
providers of pensions are necessary. For example:
The Netherlands want to improve the information furnished by
pension providers about for instance indexation, investment policy,
capital position and setting of contributions.
The German government expanded already the obligations to inform
prior to conclusion of contract. Providers must give information on
possible investments, the structure of the portfolio and the risk
potential. Furthermore, standard calculations by the providers
should enable consumers to compare products better. Concerning
pension fund management,
Ireland established an ombudsman procedure that investigate and
determined complaints made by beneficiaries who suffered losses as

179. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (EC) No.
41/2003 of June 3, 2003, O.J. (L235) 10.
180. See Initial review of key aspects of the implementation of the IORP
directive, at 8-9, CEIOPS - OP - 03 08, available at

http://www.gcactuaries.org/documents/ceiopsReportIORPdirective
_march08.pdf (providing an overview on the current state of implementation).
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result of maladministration. 81
These requests from some Member States to go further are
based on the proven financial illiteracy of members in a scheme. It
remains without any doubt a real challenge to increase the insured
persons' knowledge of the operation of the pensions systems.
Better individual information should raise awareness about
pension matters. But, it does not necessarily enable individuals to
take appropriate action if they feel that they should do more to
provide for their retirement. While individual choice gains more
importance in the preparation of adequate pensions, the state has
to provide its citizens with a suitable financial education. 8 2
In most Member States, pension schemes already had to
provide periodical reports to supervision authorities prior to the
IORP directive (macro level). The IORP directive made it into a
European rule.
The directive requires that the competent
authorities, in respect of any institution located in their territory,
have the necessary powers and means to obtain regularly the
statement of investment-policy principles, the annual accounts
and annual reports, and all the documents necessary for the
purposes of supervision.
As of April 2008, recent analysis shows that, although it is a
European rule, these reporting requirements currently differ
widely between Member States. This difference does not only
apply to the amount of information/documents that have to be
submitted to the supervisory authority but also to the content of
information/documents, the time interval/frequency and the
institution/party on which the reporting obligation lies. Some
Member States also reported different reporting requirements for
different types of schemes.' 83 No wonder CEIOPS concluded that
"further analytical work may be beneficial."'' 84 Hence, Member
States undoubtedly plan to reinforce the monitoring capacity of
the supervision authority in the coming years.
The macro and micro level are clearly linked to one another in
the EU. Information to members of private pension plans is
crucial with regard to the amount of benefits individuals are likely
to receive. While these depend on expected return rates and
administrative expenses, it is also crucial that regulators

181. See Technical Annex, supra note 105, at 93-96.
182. Id. The UK government, including the Financial Services Authority, is
developing a combined national strategy for improving financial capability
mainly in schools and through the workplace. This strategy aims to ensure
that people in the United Kingdom are better informed to allow them to take
greater responsibility for their financial affairs. Poland has included banking,
service and capital markets as mandatory curriculum subjects in secondary

schools since 2003. Id.
183. CEIOPS, supranote 152, at 8-9 and appendix 5.
184. Id.
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determine tight and uniform standards for the simulation of
benefits, allowing individuals to be confident on the information
18 5
they receive and to assess their options.
V.

COMPARATIVE LESSONS: A RIGHT TO OWN OR
A RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY?

The third Section makes it quite obvious that the US and the
EU differ strongly when it comes to legal aspects of occupational
and private pensions. These differences form a clear wealth for a
comparative law analysis. The main difference between the EU
and the US is of a clear ideological background. Legally this
ideological debate can be summarized as follows: do occupational
pensions create primarily a right to ownership or primarily an
entitlement to a retirement security that is based on a social good?
From a European perspective, the answers lie within three closely
interrelated sub questions:
Is there an insecure social security right?
How much Matthew can be justified?
How much government is wanted?
A. Is There an Insecure Social Security Right?
All pension systems are embedded in more general legal
structures of states. Pension systems do not stand in a legal
vacuum.
Especially occupational pensions or private pension
provisions are legally embedded in civil/common law, in taxation
law and-last but not least-social security law. The classical
example of this link with social security is the traditional off set
plans whereby the state based pension scheme is integrated in the
occupational pension scheme.
There can be no doubt: it is the height and the strength of the
social security scheme that defines and delineates the need for and
the strength of occupational and private pensions. Social security
is considered a collective responsibility while private and
occupational pensions are more inclined towards the individual
responsibility. Hence, it is the way society at large looks at
collective and individual responsibility that defines the role of the
occupational and private pensions.

185. See Technical Annex, supra note 105, at 93-6.
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The US underwent a major shift in this perspective: from
collective to individual responsibility. Burke and McCouch state it
clearly:
When ERISA was originally enacted, defined contribution plans
were viewed mainly as supplements to a basic tier of retirement
benefits provided by traditional defined benefit plans and Social
Security. As defined benefit plans have given way to 401(k)s as the
primary plan for many workers, the premise of ERISA's lenient
regulatory framework for self-directed plans appears increasingly at
odds with the goal of ensuring that employees will end up with
adequate income during retirement. Various reform proposals focus
primarily on improving default rules to provide guidance for
employees without impinging on their freedom of choice. It remains
to be seen whether such 'soft' paternalism will lead to 8greater
6
retirement security across the board for 401(k) participants.1
Hence, the role of private occupational pensions changed
dramatically.
Many American authors have recently reflected on this way of
looking at private and occupational pensions. They seem to stress
that there is too much legal emphasis on the individual
In
responsibility within the occupational pension schemes.
combination with low social security benefits, this leads to
unstable social security. Especially with regard to the shift from
DB to DC (more specifically ERISA 401(k) plans) a lot of
skepticism can be found.18 7 Two clear examples include:
Whatever else can be said, it is undeniably the case that 401(k)
plans are also more consistent with the individualist/consumer
approach that has become so prevalent in so many areas of law and
society. Employers argue that 401(k) plans give employees personal
autonomy over their financial future and many have bought into
this way of thinking. Sold on 401(k) plans during a time of stock
market boom, employees became enamored of the ability to control
188
their retirement destiny.
The Bush Administration has consistently pressed for individual
accounts as an essential component of Social Security reform. In
keeping with President Bush's insistence that '[m]odernization must
include individually controlled, voluntary personal retirement
accounts,' the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security
outlined three alternative proposals featuring individual accounts as
part of its final report issued in December 2001. Although the
proposals vary in detail and are not fully specified, they signal a
fundamental change in the structure of the existing Social Security
186. Burke, supra note 89, at 306.
187. See generally John Burit McArthur, Private Pensions and the
Justificationfor Social Security, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 1-47 (2006) (providing a

historical analysis on the private accounts and its dangers for the American
society).
188. Stabile, supra note 86, at 309-10.
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system by shifting significant risk from the public system to
18 9
individual participants.
Not surprisingly does the influence of an increasing insecure
American social security lead to a call for reform from quite a lot of
academics. Stephen Befort for example, suggests a three-step
reform agenda:
(1) adopting a mix of tax increases and benefit reductions, including
a slight rise in the retirement age, that would eliminate the
projected Social Security Trust Fund deficit while still preserving
the integrity of Social Security's critical social insurance function;
(2) making changes in the default settings for defined contribution
pension plans that would both encourage plan participation and
improve plan security; and (3) enacting a modest refundable tax
credit that would encourage low- and middle-income wage earners
to save for retirement, whether in a defined contribution plan or in a
personal savings account. 190
A plea for more security of a social nature within private
occupational pensions goes against the classical way of looking at
these pensions in the US. In most European Member States,
occupational pensions are still linked to a part of social security
and remain a collective responsibility. Private pension plans in
the US are mainly voluntary and largely tax-driven. Thus, the US
legislation emphasizes the individual responsibility.
The debate in the US is ideologically very important. The
debate can be described as a fight between the right to "own" or
the right to "social justice". A possible need for social protection
for the employees in DC plans is still unanswered. This becomes
very clear in the comparison with the EU when looking at the
chapters on coverage and benefit design. The emphasis in the US
lies clearly on the individual responsibility. The question is
whether this individual responsibility is the correct way of looking
at the problem. This theme is well known in European literature
by the so-called Matthew effect.
B. How Much Matthew can be Justified?
The Matthew effect refers to a sentence in a parable in the
Gospel of Matthew: "For unto every one that hath shall be given,
and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be
taken away even that which he hath." 191 The parable deals with a
sewer. His seeds fall on all kinds of soil: roads, rocks, thorns as

189. Burke, supra note 89, at 312.
190. Stephen F. Befort, The Perfect Storm of Retirement Insecurity: Fixing
the Three-Legged Stool of Social Security, Pensions, and Personal Savings, 91
MINN. L. REV. 938, 938-88 (2007).
191. Matthew 25:29 (King James).
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well as on good soil. For Christians the seeds symbolize the word
of God that, although it is spread to everyone, is only received by
those whose hearts are open to it. In social policy, it means that
the effect of the seeds-the policy measures that are targeted to
everyone-will only attain those that are aware of the measures
and live in conditions that allow them to benefit from them.
In social policy the Matthew effect is seen as a form of
equality inefficiency. All people are legally considered equal, but
social policy cannot fully reach its goal because this equality rule
leads in practice to another inequality. Due to socio-cultural and
socio-political factors, higher incomes will benefit relatively more
from social policy measures than lower incomes. In general,
persons with higher income have more means, possibilities and
opportunities to claim rights. Legally these rights are the same
for lower incomes, but they lack the possibility or experience to
For example, legally everybody has the same
claim them.
possibility to participate in pension savings and to benefit from the
tax allowances. However in order to be able to save, you need
money first. Obviously, not everybody has the same opportunities
for acquiring money and getting the tax allowances.
It is rather clear that there is a Matthew effect in the US
private pension system. This is linked to both the lack of pension
coverage and to the voluntary aspect of a lot of DC plans (401(k)).
The results are predictable: those who lacked pension income are
more likely to be poor. With the fairly low social security benefits,
the lowering coverage rate of the private pensions and the lacking
of significant private saving, the number of poor elderly people will
increase. All tax incentives, to encourage all forms of retirement
savings, need one condition fulfilled to be effective from a social
policy point of view: the free possibility to put cash aside for
savings. This clearly leads to the Matthew effect because only the
rich have this free possibility. Workers who do not earn enough to
save will therefore never benefit from the advantage.
Hence, from a European perspective it is wrong to state that a
voluntary participation to 401(k) plans is an advantage for
employees or that automatic enrollment is an answer to the
Matthew effect. The classical European answer for reducing a
Matthew effect is compulsion for all, leading to a more social
security oriented policy. However, this always requires more
governmental interference.
C. How Much Government is Wanted?
Social security is considered a collective responsibility while
private and occupational pensions are more inclined towards the
individual responsibility. On various aspects, such as vesting,
benefit design, coverage, portability, communication, the US is
clearly inclined towards the accentuation of the individual
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responsibility. Historically, this can be seen in the ideological
importance the US has given to individual freedom.
This
ideological importance of the individual freedom leads evidently to
another vision on the role of the government. Individual freedom
and governmental interference are nearly considered dichotomous
when it comes to private pensions.
In a European context, this dichotomy is well known. It is the
difference between public and private law. Social security is a
classical element of public law, while occupational and private
pensions are seen as private law. The difficulty is to reconcile the
goals of private and public law in social policy. Historically, the
US has been less keen on government interference than most (old)
European Member States.
The balance between individual freedom and collective
responsibility will undoubtedly come on the American policy
agenda. The debate will be very similar to the current American
debate on health provision. The political question will be: how can
a modern welfare state such as the US justify a growing number of
poor seniors?
VI. CONCLUSION : DISPARITY OR UNIFORMITY - CURSE OR BLESSING ?

The EU and the US have clear different views on private and
Ideologically, they are worlds apart.
occupational pensions.
However, some Member States such as the UK, Ireland, Poland,
Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania are closely linked to the US. Yet,
some other Member States such as the Netherlands, Belgium,
Spain or Portugal are dissimilar to that of the US. Legally, the
main difference between the US and the EU is clearly the presence
and the lack of federal legislation on private or occupational
pensions. Is this main difference in legal structure a curse or a
blessing? It is evident that there is little common European
framework while there is an increasing level of detailed regulation
in the US.
I believe the European disparity remains a true problem for
creating a true Europe. I would therefore like to join two scientific
colleagues, Leibfried and Piersson, who wrote: "When it comes
down to real social policy in Europe: a saga on high aspirations
and modest results, marked by cheap talk."'192 This problem is
generally recognized. The differences between Member States
seriously complicate matters. As Mario Monti, a Member of the
European Commission responsible for the Internal Market and the
Financial Services, stated: "Any solution to the pension problem
will be inadequate unless we can clear the confusion that currently

192. Stephen Leifried & Paul Pierson, Semisovereign Welfare States: Social
Policy in a multitiered Europe, in EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY BETWEEN
FRAGMENTATION AND INTEGRATION, at 46 (1995).
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exists between Europe's divergent systems." 193 So, Europe's
disparity is a curse.
However, looking at the American more unified structure, the
question arises what would a more unified European structure
look like? Comparing Europe's systems to the US could be a very
meaningful lesson. In the US, it is clear that occupational
pensions are not considered social goods. They do not form a part
of social security, there is a Matthew effect due to the voluntary
nature and the role of government is very limited. Poverty
amongst the elder can be foreseen.
Thus, it might be better to have a working (but clearly legal
annoying) disparity than a non-working unity when it comes to
social protection. In the current state of affairs, the European
Union is legally quasi entirely focused on the economic structures.
The social European Union is quasi non-existent due to the legal
constraints. If there would be for example one American state
that would like to be more "social" than the others, how would this
work? Today, each European Member State can still define the
social role of its occupational pensions. The differences between
the ten new Member States of the former Soviet Union alliance
and the other Member States are unmistakable in this respect.
In these new Member States the role of occupational pensions
is less related to the social security idea than in the other Member
States (for example all mandatory affiliation with a DC plan). In
other Member States, the social role of occupational pensions still
dominates. However, the current economic view of the European
Union jeopardizes this. From a strict economic perspective, it is a
lot easier to understand occupational pensions as financial
instruments than as social goods. So, from that point of view, I
194
believe Europe's disparity is currently a blessing.

193. Mario Monti, Opening Speech, Pension schemes: Features and
Challenges of the EuropeanSocial Model, 12 (W. Van Velzen ed., Paris M & M
1998).
194. See supranote 110 and accompanying text.

